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CHAPTER I
Are Entry Wages Really (Nominally) Flexible?
1.1 Introduction
Downward nominal wage rigidity is often hypothesized to amplify unemployment fluctuations
by constraining the responsiveness of wages to negative shocks. There is considerable evidence that
the wages of incumbent workers are downwardly rigid, but the wages of new hires appear to be
significantly more flexible. Because entry wages determine job creation over the business cycle,
a substantial literature argues that downward nominal wage rigidity (hereafter, wage rigidity) is
unlikely to explain unemployment dynamics.1
In this paper we argue that the apparent flexibility of entry wages is an artifact of selection bias.
If unemployed workers are heterogeneous in their ability or willingness to reduce their reservation
wages, those with more flexible reservation wages will be more likely to become re-employed. Because
new hires will be disproportionately workers with flexible wages, the observed wages of new hires
will appear flexible. The unobserved reservation wages of the workers who are not hired, however,
may be quite rigid.
We estimate worker wage elasticities with respect to aggregate labor productivity and unemploy-
ment in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Current Population Survey. We confirm the
This chapter is co-authored with Gabriel Ehrlich and Joshua Montes. I would like to thank Charles Brown, Susan
Collins, George Fulton, Christopher House, Pawel Krowlikowski, Ryan Nunn, David Ratner, and Matthew Shapiro
for helpful comments. All errors are our own.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ and should not be interpreted as the views of the
Congressional Budget Office.
1See, for instance, Pissarides (2009), Haefke et al. (2013), and Kudlyak (2014).
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consensus in the literature that wages appear to be more elastic for new hires than for incumbents.
We contrast this evidence with histograms of nominal wage changes from the same survey data,
which exhibit substantial downward nominal wage rigidity in all years for both long-time workers
(hereafter job stayers) and for workers with recent spells of non-employment (job finders).
We construct a search and matching model of the labor market and show that hiring wages
can appear flexible even if unemployed workers’ reservation wages are quite rigid. We estimate the
parameters of the model using indirect inference and find substantial nominal rigidity for both job
stayers and finders. Using simulated data from the estimated model, we show that the elasticities of
observed wages closely resemble those in the data for job stayers and job finders: finders display more
elastic wages than stayers. Those elasticities are not targets of the model estimation. The model’s
ability to generate disparate wage elasticities among job stayers and job finders stems naturally
from the selection bias inherent in conditioning the sample on observed wages. Pooling unemployed
workers’ reservation wages with the observed wages of job finders brings the elasticity of the wages
of potential new hires substantially closer to that of job stayers.
Dynamic simulations of the model clarify the mechanisms by which aggregate observed wages
appear more responsive to labor market conditions than the underlying levels of wage rigidity would
imply. Although the observed wages of job finders fall sharply in response to a negative shock, the
reservation wages of unemployed workers remain rigid. This asymmetry highlights the pitfalls of
selecting on successful job finding to measure wage responsiveness to aggregate economic conditions
among potential new hires. Layoffs rise immediately in response to a negative shock, followed by
a persistent decrease in the job finding rate, the majority of which can be attributed to the rigid
reservation wages of unemployed workers. The importance of wage rigidity in our model to flows out
of unemployment re-establishes its potential as an explanation for observed unemployment volatility.
At least since Shimer’s (2005) demonstration that the canonical search and matching model of the
labor market with perfectly flexible wages cannot replicate the observed volatility in unemployment,
a large literature has explored whether adding some form of wage rigidity can help to reconcile the
model to the data. Prominent examples include Hall (2005), who introduces real wage rigidity via
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a bargaining norm between workers and employers, Gertler and Trigari (2009), who model wage
bargaining with staggered multi-period contracts, and Christiano et al. (2015), who endogenously
derive wage rigidity from alternating offers in bargaining negotiations.
Several empirical studies, however, show that the wages of new hires are much more responsive
to labor market conditions than the wages of longer-tenured workers. Bils (1985), Shin (1994), Solon
et al. (1994), Devereux (2001), and Shin and Solon (2006) all find lower elasticities of wages with
respect to the unemployment rate for tenured workers than for all workers. Bils (1985), Shin (1994),
and Barlevy (2001) find specifically that the elasticity for those in new matches is much higher
than the estimates for incumbent workers. Furthermore, Haefke et al. (2013), after correcting for
composition bias in worker subgroups, obtain much higher elasticities in the aggregate wages of new
hires with respect to average labor market productivity than for the worker population generally. As
Pissarides (2009) summarizes the evidence, “Time-series or panel studies on the cyclical volatility
of wages show considerable stickiness, but this evidence is dominated by wages in ongoing jobs and
is not relevant for job creation in the search and matching model.”2
Notably, the time series evidence contrasts starkly with the direct survey evidence on unemployed
workers’ reservation wages reported by Krueger and Mueller (2014). They find that “...self-reported
reservation wages decline at a modest rate over the spell of unemployment...” They argue that
their evidence suggests that “...many workers persistently misjudge their prospects or anchor their
reservation wage on their previous wage.” We argue that a model with heterogeneity in the rigidity
of unemployed workers’ wages resolves the apparent contradiction between these two sources of
evidence.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 1.2, we establish within two different
data sources the key empirical elasticities regarding entry wage rigidity. In section 1.3 we employ
those same data sources to provide evidence in favor of wage rigidity for both job stayers and job
finders. In section 1.4 we introduce a labor search model with explicit downward nominal wage
2Elsby et al. (2013) are also skeptical of the role that downward nominal wage rigidity plays in unemployment
fluctuations. They find a significant number of nominal wage cuts in CPS data and point out that in the Great
Recession the most notable distinction from previous contractions, which occurred in times of higher inflation, is not
in separations but in the duration of unemployment. This result puts the onus on entry rigidity to explain the data,
a hypothesis for which they find little theoretical and no empirical support.
3
rigidity for all workers. In section 3.5 we estimate the model and illustrate the results. Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Elasticities for Job Stayers, Switchers, and New Hires
Our empirical analysis utilizes longitudinal data from two sources, the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). We use the PSID to conduct analyses
similar to those in Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) and Devereux (2001), in which we estimate the
elasticities of the real wages of job stayers and all employed workers with respect to the unemployment
rate. We use the CPS to estimate the elasticity of real wages of all workers and job finders with
respect to average labor productivity, in the spirit of Haefke et al. (2013). In both cases, we
confirm the qualitative patterns in the original studies: the wages of job stayers are less responsive
to the unemployment rate than are the wages of all workers, and the wages of job finders are more
responsive to labor productivity than are the wages of all workers.
1.2.1 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The PSID contains data on employment, salary, and hourly wages for household heads and their
spouses. We combine the 1980-1997 annual surveys with the 1999-2013 biannual surveys to construct
an employment history for respondents that spans from 1980-2013.3 The number of respondents in
these surveys averages about 12,500 per year.4 The PSID includes occupational codes and industry
codes, as well as job start and end dates, which allows us to determine worker tenure over several
years.
Table 1.1 provides a summary description of some key variables in the analysis. About 24
percent of those surveyed are salaried workers, while almost 35 percent are hourly employees. The
remainder is disproportionately retired or otherwise out of the labor force. Our analysis focuses
on hourly workers, for whom we have wage data, and salaried workers, for whom we construct an
3We begin the analysis in 1980 because hourly wages are top-coded at very restrictive levels in the 1978 and prior
surveys.
4We include spouses in the analysis when we consider the entire universe of working adults. The inclusion of
spouses is necessary to ensure that the primary earner in a family is present in the analysis because the PSID codes
household heads by gender. We also include some results that are restricted to male heads of household to facilitate
comparisons with past studies. That restriction does not change the qualitative results.
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hourly wage. Most salaried workers do not provide a consistent measure of hours for their primary
job, so we assume a fixed number of hours from year to year; this assumption seems reasonable for
those who stay at the same job from one survey to the next (about 66 percent of salaried workers),
but potentially biases the hourly wage for those who switch jobs.
We categorize the set of employed workers as job stayers, job switchers, and job finders.5 Job
stayers are defined as workers who provided a start date at their current job prior to the last time
they were surveyed, when available, or who provided a tenure length at their current employer
exceeding the time between survey dates if the start date is unavailable. In addition, job stayers
must have had continuous employment between survey dates without spells of unemployment or time
out of the labor force. Job switchers are defined as workers who maintained continuous employment,
defined by no months in which they were unemployed or out of the labor force, but who provided a
start date between survey dates. Job finders are defined as workers who were employed at the time
of both the current and prior surveys, but who report having spent time between surveys as either
unemployed or out of the labor force.6
We estimate regressions of the form:
∆ lnwit = β0 + β1t+ β2∆Ut + β3Xit + εit, (1.1)
in which wit is the nominal hourly wage, Ut is the national unemployment rate, and Xit is a
polynomial measure of work experience and job tenure for worker i at year t. These regressions
follow Devereux (2001), who in turn builds on Solon et al. (1994). We use both the dependent
variable in Devereux (2001), which is limited to earnings in the worker’s primary job, as well as that
in Solon et al. (1994), who use all earnings in the surveyed year. In addition, although Solon et al.
5Although our categorization involves some subjective judgment, which may induce misclassification, we will clas-
sify workers using identical definitions in our estimation of the theoretical model. This method of indirect inference
allows us to correct for possible misspecification in these definitions. See section 1.5.1 for more details. Our catego-
rization is a partition of all workers who have valid wages in consecutive surveys.
6Note that this definition excludes first-time entrants and re-entrants who spent multiple years unemployed or
out of the labor force. Before concluding this section, we want to reiterate that in both datasets our definition of
job finders excludes new entrants to the labor market. According to our CPS dataset, over the past 20 years, new
entrants constitute between 6-12 percent of the unemployed looking for work and average only 8.6 percent of the total
unemployed during that time.
5
(1994) include only men, we include both men and women in our sample.7
Table 1.2 presents the results of our regressions. Although our sample periods differ, and our
inclusion of women alters our sample slightly compared to Solon et al.’s, our analysis recovers the
same basic fact pattern as the earlier studies. When we confine our sample to the years in which
we have annual surveys (1980 to 1997), we estimate that the elasticity of all wages with respect to
the annual unemployment rate is -0.83, versus -0.55 for job stayers. When we extend the analysis
to include job switchers and job finders, we estimate elasticities of -1.80 and -1.82, respectively, far
larger (in absolute value) than for all workers or job stayers. Extending the sample forward in time
to incorporate the biannual surveys from 1999 to 2013 yields uniformly smaller elasticities, but the
relative magnitudes among all workers, job stayers, and job finders are unaffected.
Our specifications using the average annual wage give similar qualitative results. When we end
the sample at 1997, we estimate that the elasticity of real wages with respect to unemployment is
-0.7 for all workers and -0.49 for job stayers. When we analyze job finders separately, we estimate
an elasticity of -1.65, consistent with the notion that job finders’ wages are more responsive to labor
market conditions than the wages of other workers. When we extend the sample to include years
through 2013, we see somewhat higher elasticities, but the relative magnitudes among all workers,
job stayers, and job finders are unaffected.
1.2.2 Current Population Survey
The CPS’s outgoing rotation group includes data on wages and weekly hours worked for all
members of a household, job codes, and demographic information, along with data from the basic
monthly files that include the employment history of each household member. We use the merged
datasets of Drew et al. (2014), who build on the methodology of Madrian and Lefgren (2000) to link
CPS responses from the same individual longitudinally for up to 16 months, the maximum time that
individuals are covered by the survey. The structure of the CPS is such that individuals are surveyed
for four consecutive months, are out of the survey for eight months, and then are surveyed again
7Both papers use a two-step process to address potential bias in their standard errors due to common time effects
across workers. We address this issue by clustering standard errors by year and estimate the regression in equation
1.1 directly.
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for four more months. This design allows us to construct a year-over-year measure of wage changes
for individuals in the outgoing rotation groups. We combine the 1989-2013 monthly surveys with
aggregate labor market data such as the unemployment rate, labor productivity, CPI-U measure of
inflation, and the private consumption implicit price deflator.
Following the procedure of Haefke et al. (2013), we restrict the dataset to nonfarm, nonsuper-
visory, private-sector workers, trim outliers in hours worked and in implied hourly earnings, impute
top-coded earnings according to the procedure in Schmitt (2003), and use typical hours worked per
week as our divisor in the determination of the hourly wage for salaried workers.8 We construct
a variable for years of school and a standard measure of potential experience (age minus years of
school minus 6). Finally, we include dummy variables for female, black, Hispanic, and married with
spouse present in our list of covariates.
Haefke et al. (2013) investigate the effect of changes in productivity on aggregate real wages
of both job finders and all workers. To account for composition bias in each group, they remove
demographically explainable wage determinants for all workers via a Mincer regression, and then
analyze the effects of labor market indicators on the respective residualized aggregate wages. They
define a job finder, or new hire, as any worker who had an unemployment spell in the prior 3 months.
We adopt that definition of a job finder in the CPS, as we do not have employment information
for the 8 months prior to those 3.9 Therefore, our definition of job finder is more restrictive in the
CPS than in the PSID, which allows for the measurement of nonemployment spells further from the
survey date.
Haefke et al. (2013) estimate the following specification by quarter for each subgroup j of workers
from 1984 to 2006:10
∆ lnwjt = β0,j + β1,j∆ ln yt + εjt, (1.2)
8In contrast, Card and Hyslop (1997) and Elsby et al. (2013) use usual weekly earnings for salaried workers.
9See Drew et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion of the structure of the CPS.
10They exclude 1995q3 and 1995q4 from analysis because of a change in sample design that makes it difficult to
match workers, add quarter dummies to account for residual seasonality, and add a dummy for 2003q1 to reflect the
change in occupation classification in 2003 that increases the fraction of supervisory workers.
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where wjt is their residualized real wage series for group j and yt is a measure of labor productivity.
Haefke et al.’s preferred specification deflates wages by the BLS private nonfarm business sector
implicit deflator and uses aggregate labor productivity as their aggregate labor market indicator of
interest.11
We follow the spirit of Haefke et al.’s analysis, with the major exception that we use the lon-
gitudinal aspect of the CPS to calculate the year-over-year change in wages for individual workers
and use those changes as the outcome of interest in our analysis. We choose this approach over
the residualization approach of Haefke et al. (2013) because it is more consistent with our analysis
using the PSID data and because using within-worker wage changes corrects for unobservable com-
positional changes among worker groups in addition to observable ones. On the other hand, this
approach restricts the sample of workers who could potentially be considered new hires, and requires
year-over-year as opposed to quarter-over-quarter comparisons. This restriction also means that we
include individuals only once, the second time they reach the outgoing rotation group. Additionally,
we use the private consumption deflator as our measure of inflation (using the CPI-U has almost no
effect on the results). We therefore run the following regressions for job finders and all workers:
∆ lnwijt = β0,j + β1,j∆ ln yt + β2,jXit + εit, (1.3)
where an observation is a worker i in worker group j and calendar quarter t, and the first difference
terms represent year-on-year changes. Xit is a cubic polynomial in experience, consistent with our
analysis using the PSID data.
Table 1.3 presents the results of our regressions, along with some key results from Haefke et
al. (2013) for comparison. Whereas Haefke et al. (2013) estimate that the elasticities of the real
wages of all workers and job finders with respect to average labor productivity are 0.24 and 0.79,
respectively, we estimate those elasticities as 0.29 and 0.55. Part of the reason that we estimate a
lower elasticity for job finders is our inclusion of more recent calendar years, which in our analysis
11The aggregate labor productivity series published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics has been revised subsequent
to the publication of their paper, which complicates the comparison of our results to theirs.
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of the PSID data led to less estimated responsiveness of wages to labor market conditions.
Overall, we view our results as qualitatively similar to Haefke et al.’s: the wages of new hires
are more responsive to productivity changes than are the wages of all workers.12 More broadly, the
estimates in this section confirm the key patterns in the literature: the observed real wages of job
finders are roughly twice as responsive to changes in labor market conditions as the real wages of
all workers, which are themselves more responsive than the wages of job stayers.
1.3 Estimating Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity for Job Stayers, Job
Switchers, and New Hires
In this section, we employ a complementary approach to those in section 1.2 to measuring wage
rigidity. We focus particularly here on downward nominal wage rigidity by attempting to measure
the proportion of wage cuts that would have occurred in a counterfactual environment with perfectly
flexible wages that are “missing” from the observed data. We estimate this proportion using the
method in Ehrlich and Montes (2014), which builds on the method of Card and Hyslop (1997). The
essence of the method is to extrapolate from the upper half of the observed wage change distribution
to what the nominally negative portion of the distribution would look like in the absence of rigidity,
and calculate the proportion of counterfactual mass that is missing in the observed distribution.13
Although such analyses have typically focused on the wages of job stayers, the same method can be
extended to job switchers and job finders, as shown in the subsections below.
The key results that emerge from performing this analysis in the PSID and CPS are that the
observed wages of job finders exhibit less downward nominal wage rigidity than the wages of job
stayers, but the degree of rigidity in job finders’ wages is nonetheless substantial. We begin this
section by describing the visual evidence for wage rigidity in the PSID and CPS, before providing
formal estimates of the degrees of nominal rigidity.
12Again, we note that our definition of new hires is restricted to workers who were employed one year previously,
which is not the case for Haefke et al. (2013).
13The appendix describes the method in detail.
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1.3.1 PSID
Our longitudinal dataset using survey data from the PSID includes 144,047 observations of
(constructed) hourly wage data matched to the same worker in consecutive surveys over 25 surveys,
the majority of the observations being job stayers. Figure 1.1 illustrates these data in histograms of
one-year and two-year percent wage changes for job stayers, job switchers, and job finders for survey
years 1980-2013. The histograms are truncated at -50 and 50 percent, with a dotted vertical line to
indicate a zero percent nominal wage change.14
The first row of histograms in figure 1.1 contain a spike in the proportion of reported wage
changes at nominal zero, which we interpret as one of the hallmarks of downward nominal wage
rigidity. There is also a visually evident asymmetry between the nominally positive and nominally
negative portions of the distribution, as the proportions of nominally negative wage changes are
smaller than a simple extrapolation from the nominally positive portion of the distribution would
indicate. This asymmetry is especially evident in the 2-year changes in the histogram for job stayers,
which contain sample years with lower inflation, among other factors, leading to smaller nominal
wage increases. Negative wage changes have nevertheless remained relatively uncommon; thus, the
distribution of wages has “piled up” against the barrier at nominal zero.
The second and third rows of figure 1.1 show similar histograms for job switchers and job finders,
respectively. The dispersion of wage changes is higher for both job switchers and job finders than
for job stayers. Furthermore, the median wage change for job finders, at 3.7%, is lower than for
job stayers, which is 4.6%. Nevertheless, the histograms share significant similarities with those
for stayers: 1) a spike at nominal zero, and 2) asymmetry between the nominally positive and
nominally negative portions of the wage change distribution. There is less mass in the nominally
negative portion than would be implied by a symmetrical wage change histogram, consistent with
the idea that the wages of job switchers and job finders exhibit some degree of downward nominal
rigidity.
14Individual-year histograms of wage changes for stayers, switchers, and finders are also shown in the appendix.
Each year exhibits the same basic pattern, with a spike at nominal 0 wage change.
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1.3.2 CPS
Figure 1.2 provides wage change histograms for all workers, all workers excluding job finders,
and job finders only in the CPS outgoing rotation groups for the years 1989 to 2013. We censor the
histograms at -80% and 80% because the sample sizes are larger than in the PSID.15 The sample
is limited to those workers who can be matched between their 4th and 16th months in the survey.
We divide these workers into job finders and non-job finders, a combination of job stayers and job
switchers, as described in section 1.2.2. There are 23,600 total wage changes on average per surveyed
year, of which approximately 900 per year come from workers we classify as job finders.
The histograms in figure 1.2 are qualitatively similar to those in figure 1.1. There are large
spikes at nominal zero and an asymmetry between the nominally positive and negative portions of
the distributions, with the latter displaying “missing” mass. Again, the wage change distributions
of job finders display weaker, but still suggestive, evidence of downward nominal rigidities than the
distributions for other workers.
1.3.3 Systematic Measurement of Wage Rigidity
In this section we provide formal estimates of the proportion of nominal wage cuts that would
have occurred in an environment with no nominal wage rigidity that are instead prevented by
downward nominal wage rigidity. The basic approach, described in detail in the appendix, is to
construct an empirical distribution of log nominal wage changes and reflect the 50-100th percentile
of changes back on the 0-50th percentiles. The implied share of nominal wage cuts that would be
expected based on the upper half of the wage change distribution is compared with the actual share
of nominal wage cuts. The statistic:
ŵr = 1− Fˆ
obs(0-)
Fˆ cf (0-)
(1.4)
15Year-by-year histograms for each category of worker are found in the appendix. The histograms for 1995 are
omitted because a change in sampling design does not permit matches of worker wages to their employment history.
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represents the fraction of wage changes that are “missing”, where Fˆ cf (0-) is the estimated coun-
terfactual distribution of log wage changes and Fˆ obs(0-) is the empirical distribution of log wage
changes.
This statistic reflects the combination of two phenomena associated with downward nominal
wage rigidity. First, it captures the extent to which slightly negative nominal wage changes are
“swept up” to nominal 0. Second, it may also capture the share of workers who would have received
a wage cut in an environment with flexible wages but who instead separated from their employer
either through a layoff or a quit.
Table 1.4 displays our estimates of the proportion of nominal wage cuts prevented by wage
rigidity both in the PSID and in the CPS. The table presents estimates for the PSID for job stayers,
job switchers, and job finders for the years 1980 to 2013, and for the CPS for all workers, non-job
finders, and job-finders for the years 1989 to 2013. The table also displays separate estimates for
salaried and hourly workers.
We estimate that 52.7% of counterfactual nominal wage cuts are missing among job stayers in
the PSID, versus 56.1% and 36.4%, respectively, for job switchers and job finders. The estimates
for salaried and hourly workers do not differ systematically: salaried job stayers display less wage
rigidity than hourly job stayers, but salaried job switchers and finders display more wage rigidity
than their hourly counterparts.
The estimates using the CPS data are qualitatively similar. We estimate that among all workers,
47.4% of counterfactual nominal wage cuts were prevented by wage rigidity, versus 38.6% for job
finders. Again, the estimate for salaried and hourly workers do not vary in a consistent fashion.
One potential limitation of using reported survey data on nominal wages over time to estimate
wage changes is that respondents may round their hourly wage to the nearest dollar or half dollar,
or their salary to the nearest 1000 dollar value.16 This rounding could lead to an overstatement of
the number of unchanged nominal wages from year to year. An inflated number of unchanged wages
could bias our measure of rigidity if small wage cuts disappear due to rounding. To examine the
16See, for instance, Altonji and Williams (1997).
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potential effect such rounding has on our results, we re-estimate wage rigidity for hourly workers
after excluding all round-dollar results (about one third of the sample for incumbents and finders,
slightly less for switchers). Reassuringly, the percent of counterfactual wage cuts prevented by wage
rigidity decreases only from 55.1% (see table 1.4) among job stayers to 53.6%, with that third of
respondents excluded from the analysis, while rigidity among job switchers declined from 50.2%
to 48.4%. Finders registered a wage rigidity measure of 35.4%, versus 36.6% including the entire
sample of hourly employees.
We interpret these estimates as indicating a substantial amount of downward nominal wage
rigidity for workers in the United States economy. Importantly, although the wages of job finders
appear to exhibit less rigidity than the wages of other workers, they are by no means perfectly
flexible. Therefore, these results stand in some contrast to the results in section 1.2, which indicated
much more responsiveness of the wages of job finders to labor market conditions than the wages of
job stayers. In the next section, we build a search and matching model of the labor market that
attempts to reconcile these results, and implies that the apparent flexibility of the wages of job
finders stems from composition bias in the pool of newly hired workers.
1.4 Model
We consider a general equilibrium model with search and matching in the labor market that is
closely related to the canonical model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). However, we model wage
setting differently than those authors do. We assume, as in Barattieri et al. (2010) and Daly and
Hobijn (2014), that workers set their wages unilaterally. We further follow Daly and Hobijn (2014)
by adopting a Calvo-style (1983) process: we assume that in any given period, a fraction of workers
are constrained from reducing their nominal wages. The model allows the fractions of employed and
unemployed workers who are prevented from reducing their wage demands to differ.
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1.4.1 Model Environment
We consider the stationary equilibrium of a discrete time model with no aggregate shocks but
with shocks to a worker’s idiosyncratic productivity and their ability to reduce their nominal wage
demands each period. Each firm has one job, which can either be vacant or filled and producing
output. There is a unit mass of workers who can be either employed in a job or unemployed and
searching for a job.
Firms and workers are infinitely lived with a common discount rate β and have linear preferences
over profits and consumption, respectively. Workers and firms cannot store goods, thus workers
consume their entire incomes each period. There is also no intensive margin of labor supply: workers
in a filled job supply exactly one unit of labor, L, each period. Unemployed workers receive an
unemployment benefit b each period.
Firms in a match with a worker can decide whether to continue to employ the worker at the
worker’s demanded wage or to terminate the job. Labor is the only input into production, and the
output of a filled job is given by:
Y = pL = p (1.5)
where p is stochastic and can be conceptualized either as the productivity of a worker or the price
of a job’s output. We refer to p as productivity in this paper. The per-period profits pi of a firm
with a worker with productivity p and paying wage w are then:
pi(p, w) = p− w. (1.6)
Firms that are not in a match and wish to meet with a worker must post a vacancy at per-period
cost c, expressed in units of output. There is free entry into vacancy posting.
Unemployed workers and firms with vacant jobs form matches according to a matching function
m(v, u), where v is the number of vacancies and u is the number of workers who are unemployed.17
17Because we have normalized the number of workers to 1, the number of unemployed is synonymous with the
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We assume that the matching function has the Cobb-Douglas form:
m(v, u) = Avφu1−φ (1.7)
where A is a parameter that governs matching efficiency and φ is the elasticity of the matching
function with respect to the number of vacancies. Denoting ‘labor market tightness’ v/u as θ, the
probability f that a worker meets a vacancy is f(θ) = m(v, u)/u = Aθφ. The probability q that a
firm with a vacant job meets an unemployed worker is q(θ) = m(v, u)/v = Aθφ−1.
There is no on-the-job search, and matches end with exogenous probability sx each period.
Endogenous separations occur in two ways. First, matches end when the productivity level of the
match falls to a low enough level that the match surplus between the worker and firm is exhausted.
Those separations are bilaterally efficient. Second, bilaterally inefficient separations occur when the
worker is unable to cut his or her nominal wage demand below the maximum level that the firm is
willing to pay, but would have been willing to do so in an environment with flexible wages.
We model wage rigidity according to the process in Calvo (1983). Employed and unemployed
workers set their reservation wages unilaterally. We assume employed and unemployed workers are
unable to reduce their wage demand in any given period, with probabilities λE and λU , respectively.
Firms then decide whether to continue or to terminate matches given workers’ wage demands.
The timing of each period is as follows:
1. The period begins and employed and unemployed workers draw realizations of whether they
can reduce their reservation wages in the period.
2. Workers draw their idiosyncratic productivity levels, and firms and workers observe workers’
productivity levels.
3. Firms post vacancies and matching between vacancies and unemployed workers occurs.
Not every match between an unemployed worker and a vacancy will result in the formation of
a new job both because of exogenous separations and because the worker’s wage demand may
be higher than the firm will accept. To distinguish between a match and a new employment
relationship that enters production, we will call a match between an unemployed worker and a
vacant job an interview. The probabilities f and q are the likelihoods of an unemployed worker
receiving an interview in a given period and of a firm that has posted a vacancy interviewing
a worker, respectively.
4. Exogenous separations occur.
unemployment rate, and we will use the two interchangeably.
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Note that exogenous separations can occur even in new interviews, such that the worker is
never employed by the firm regardless of productivity levels or wage demands.
5. Workers in a negotiation set their wage demands, while unemployed workers re-set their reser-
vation wages.
6. Firms decide whether to accept matched workers’ wage demands and proceed to production,
or to terminate the relationship.
We will refer to the process of workers setting their wage demands and firms deciding whether
to accept them as a negotiation, although there is no actual bargaining involved. Note that
from the firm’s perspective, there is no difference between a negotiation with a previously
unemployed worker and a worker in an ongoing employment relationship. Therefore, we will
not generally distinguish between the two.18
7. Production occurs, wages and unemployment benefits are paid, profits are earned, and con-
sumption occurs.
8. The period ends.
Firms can therefore be in two different states, with an unfilled vacancy or in a match with a
worker. We will denote the values to the firm of being in these states as V and J , respectively.
Workers can find themselves in four possible states: unemployed with a flexible wage, unemployed
with a rigid wage, employed with a flexible wage, and employed with a rigid wage. We will denote
the values of the worker to being in these states as UF , UR, WR, and WF , respectively. We define
the value functions for these states in sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3.
We assume that a worker’s log productivity follows the AR(1) process:
ln p = (1− ψp) ln p¯+ ψp ln p−1 + εp, εp ∼ N
(
0, σ2p
)
. (1.8)
Productivity is a time-varying, mean-reverting characteristic of the individual worker. Further, a
worker’s productivity process persists in unemployment. The productivity distribution of employed
workers will differ from the distribution for all workers because firms will lay off workers when their
reservation wages exceed the cutoff value associated with the worker’s productivity.19
1.4.2 Firm’s Problem
The value to the firm of posting a vacancy, denoted V , is defined in step 3 in the timeline and
given as:
V = −c+ q(θ)(1− sx)
∫∫
J(p, w) dG(p, w) + (1− q(θ)(1− sx))βE[V ′], (1.9)
18The distinction does matter for calculating employment flows such as job creation and job destruction.
19It is unnecessary that a worker’s productivity level be higher than the worker’s wage in every period due to the
associated option value of a match.
16
where G(p, w) is the stationary joint cumulative distribution of productivity levels and wage demands
from unemployed workers. The firm incurs the flow cost c of posting a vacancy and gains the expected
value of a negotiation with probability q(θ)(1−sx), which accounts for both the likelihood of a match
and its survival to become a negotiation, as well as the continuation value of the vacancy conditional
on not matching.
The value to the firm of being in a negotiation with a match of productivity p and worker
reservation wage w, denoted by J and defined in step 6 in the timeline, is given by:
J(p, w) = max
discontinue,continue
{
βE[V ′],
p− w + β(1− sx)
∫∫
J(p′, w′) dF (p′|p)dH(w′|p′, w)
}
. (1.10)
The firm decides between terminating the match or entering into production with the matched
worker. In production the firm receives the flow surplus p− w and the expected continuation value
of a filled job conditional on the current period’s wage and productivity (inclusive of the risk of
an exogenous separation during negotiation next period). F (p′|p) is the cumulative distribution
function of next period’s productivity level given this period’s productivity, and H(w′|p′, w) is the
cumulative distribution function of next period’s wage demands for a worker in a filled job given
current wage w and next-period’s productivity level p′.20
Given equation 1.10, we can define the wage for which the firm is indifferent between continuing
and terminating the employment relationship. That cutoff wage, denoted as w˜(p), is a function of
productivity and solves the equation:
βE[V ′] = p− w + β(1− sx)
∫∫
J(p′, w′) dF (p′|p)dH(w′|p′, w). (1.11)
1.4.3 Worker’s Problem
We define the worker’s value functions as of step 5 in the model, after matching and exogenous
separations have occurred, when the worker must decide his or her reservation wage. The value
of being in a negotiation with a flexible wage is a function of this period’s productivity level, and
we denote it WF (p). The value of being in a negotiation with a rigid wage depends on both this
period’s productivity and last period’s wage demand, and we denote it WR(p, w−1). It is sometimes
convenient to represent expectations of next period’s value of being employed, without knowing
20The expected value of a match next period can be further decomposed based on the probability of wage adjustment
next period, but we omit that characterization here.
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whether the worker’s wages will be flexible or rigid. We denote this expectation as E[W (p′, w)] =
E[(1− λE)WF (p′) + λEWR(p′, w)].
Likewise, the value of being unemployed in step 5 with a flexible reservation wage is a function
of this period’s productivity only, so we denote it UF (p). The value of being unemployed with a
rigid reservation wage is a function of this period’s productivity and last period’s wage demand, so
we denote it UR(p, w−1). When we wish to denote the expected value of being unemployed next
period, we use the notation E[U(p′, w)] = E[(1− λU )UF (p′) + λUUR(p′, w)].
The value to the worker of being in a negotiation with a flexible wage and productivity p is given
by:21
WF (p) = max
w
{
1(w ≤ w˜(p))
(
w + β
∫ {
(1− sx)E[W (p′, w)] + sxE[U(p′, w)]
}
dF (p′|p)
)
+ 1(w > w˜(p))
(
b+ β
∫ (
f(θ)(1− sx)E[W (p′, w)]
+ (1− f(θ)(1− sx))E[U(p′, w)]
)
dF (p′|p)
)}
. (1.12)
The worker chooses his or her wage demand w knowing the firm’s cutoff wage given the current
productivity level w˜(p). Choosing a wage demand lower than that cutoff, as in the first term of
the value function, yields the demanded wage this period and a continuation value associated with
starting the next period in an ongoing match with the firm. Choosing a higher wage leads to a
termination of the match, yielding the worker flow payoff b this period and a continuation value
associated with starting the next period unmatched with a firm. We denote the wage schedule that
solves this maximization problem as w?EF (p).
The value to the worker of being in a negotiation with productivity p and downwardly rigid wage
w−1 is given by:
WR(p, w−1) = 1(
w−1
1 + pi
≤ w?EF (p))WF (p) + 1(
w−1
1 + pi
> w?EF (p))× · · ·{
1(
w−1
1 + pi
≤ w˜(p))
( w−1
1 + pi
+ β
∫ [
(1− sx)E[W (p′, w−1
1 + pi
)] + sxE[U(p
′,
w−1
1 + pi
)]
)]
dF (p′|p)
)
+ 1(
w−1
1 + pi
> w˜(p))UR(p, w−1)
}
. (1.13)
The previous period’s real wage, w−1, divided by 1 + pi, where pi is the rate of inflation, represents
21We distinguish between being employed and being in a negotiation because an unemployed worker could receive
a job match in a period but have a reservation wage higher than the firm will accept. In that case, the worker will
not actually be employed in the period.
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the new real wage that corresponds with a downwardly rigid nominal wage. The first term in the
value function represents the case in which the optimal wage demand is below last period’s wage, in
which case the problem reduces to the problem of the worker with a flexible wage. In the case that
the previous period’s wage demand is binding, it may or may not be acceptable to the firm. If the
wage demand is acceptable to the firm, the worker receives that wage plus next period’s continuation
value. If it is not acceptable, the worker receives the payoffs associated with unemployment, defined
below. Implicit in WR(p, w−1) is an optimization problem, because workers have freedom to raise
their reservation wages. As written, this choice is subsumed in WF (p). The wage schedule associated
with this value function is w?ER(p). Note that w
?
ER(p, w−1) is the minimum of w−1 and w
?
EF (p).
The value to the worker of being unemployed with productivity p and a flexible reservation wage
is given by:
UF (p) = max
w
{
b+ E[f(θ′)](1− sx)β
∫
E[W (p′, w)] dF (p′|p)
+ (1− E[f(θ′)](1− sx))β
∫
E[U(p′, w)] dF (p′|p)
}
. (1.14)
The unemployed worker receives the unemployment benefit b this period and a continuation
value that reflects the probabilities of matching or failing to match next period. Since wages are
always flexible upwards, it is optimal for an unemployed worker to set their reservation wage at the
minimum possible value, for instance the minimum wage.22 The reservation wage that solves the
unemployed worker’s degenerate maximization problem is denoted as w?UF (p).
The value function for unemployed workers with productivity p and a downwardly rigid reserva-
tion wage w−1 is:
UR(p, w−1) = b+ E[f(θ′)](1− sx)β
∫
E[W (p′,
w−1
1 + pi
)] dF (p′|p)
+ (1− E[f(θ′)](1− sx))β
∫
E[U(p′,
w−1
1 + pi
)] dF (p′|p). (1.15)
This function follows the pattern of the function in the flexible wage case closely, except that it must
22As a result the value function can be expressed using only WF (p′) and UF (p′): even if next period’s wage is
rigid, the rigidity will never bind strictly. The simplified value function is
UF (p) = b+ E[f(θ′)](1− sx)β
∫
WF (p′) dF (p′|p) + (1− E[f(θ′)](1− sx))β
∫
UF (p′) dF (p′|p).
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account for the probability that wage rigidity will again be binding next period. Again, note that
w?UR(p, w−1) is the larger of w−1 and w
?
UF (p). Because the latter term is the lowest possible wage,
an unemployed worker with a rigid wage will always set this period’s reservation wage to equal last
period’s reservation wage. The wage schedule associated with this value function is w?UR(p, w−1).
1.4.4 Stationary Equilibrium
To define an equilibrium of the model, we must first derive the equations for flows into and out of
employment. The matching function dictates the number of unemployed workers who are matched
to a vacant job each period, but not all matches will result in a flow into employment, because of
exogenous separations and negotiation failures. Given the cumulative distribution of productivity
and reservation wages across unemployed workers G(p, w), with corresponding marginal distribution
Gw(w), the job creation flow of workers from unemployment to employment is determined by:
Jobs Created =
[
f(θ)(1− sx)
∫∫ w˜(p)
dG(p, w)
]
u = f(θ)(1− sx)E[Gw(w˜(p))]u (1.16)
The number of jobs created is the number of unemployed workers times the matching rate for an
interview f , the likelihood of continuation into negotiation (1−sx), and the likelihood of a successful
negotiation E[Gw(w˜(p))].
In order to determine the flow into unemployment, we define the stationary joint cumulative
distribution of productivity levels and reservation wages across employed workers, Λ(p, w). The
mass of Λ(p, w) less than the cutoff wage function w˜(p), expressed as Λw(w˜(p)), represents the
number of workers who will continue in employment next period. Then the job destruction flow of
workers from employment to unemployment is given by:
Jobs Destroyed =
[
(1− sx)
(
1−
∫∫ w˜(p)
dΛ(p, w)
)
+ sx
]
(1− u)
=
(
(1− sx)E[1− Λw(w˜(p))] + sx
)
(1− u) , (1.17)
where the stock of employed workers 1− u separates exogenously at rate sx and endogenously due
to wage demands exceeding the firms’ cutoff wage function.
The stationary unemployment rate that is consistent with these flows is therefore implicitly
defined as the u that equalizes the number of jobs created (equation 1.16) with the number of jobs
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destroyed (equation 1.17) :
u? =
(1− sx)E[1− Λw(w˜(p))] + sx
f(θ?)(1− sx)E[Gw(w˜(p))] + (1− sx)E[1− Λw(w˜(p))] + sx (1.18)
where stationary labor market tightness θ? is defined as the ratio of the stationary vacancy level v?
to the stationary unemployment level u?.
Thus, a recursive stationary equilibrium of the model is a collection of value functions {V, J,WF ,
WR, UF , UR}, a collection of policy functions {w˜(p), w?EF (p), w?ER(p, w−1), w?UF (p), w?UR(p, w−1)},
an unemployment level u?, and a vacancy level v? such that:
• Firms maximize expected profits;
• Workers maximize their expected value functions taking firms’ policies as given;
• Posting a vacancy has an expected value of zero; and
• Employment flows are consistent with firm and worker policy functions.
The appendix describes our procedure for solving the model.
1.5 Model Estimation and Results
In this section we estimate the parameters of the model described in section 1.4 and describe
some implications of the results. We also examine the model’s response to one-time permanent
shocks to aggregate productivity. We compare the results of both the steady-state model and the
simulations with aggregate shocks to the empirical results from the literature and in this paper, and
argue that the model is able to reconcile the observed facts.
1.5.1 Target Moments and Estimation
The theoretical model has 11 parameters: β, pi, φ,A, ψp, σp, b, c, λE , λU , and sx. We set β to
5 percent annually, as in Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005). Our model does not explicitly feature
real productivity growth, so we set pi to 4 percent annually to capture both price inflation and
productivity growth. Implicitly, β represents a discount factor that encompasses both pure time
preference and trend growth in consumption.
We estimate eight of the nine remaining parameters, Θ = {A,ψp, σp, b, c, λE , λU , sx}, via indirect
inference, in order to match a set of simulated moments, µˆs(Θ), to a set of real-world target moments
µ. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to the unemployment rate, 1−φ, is set to equal
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the resulting share of job surplus accruing to the worker (Hosios 1990).23 The estimated parameters
are the values that minimize Θˆ = arg min
Θ
[µˆs(Θ)−µ]′W−1[µˆs(Θ)−µ], where the weighting function
W is a diagonal matrix of the squares of the target moments.
Estimating the model via indirect inference helps to correct for potential sources of error in our
empirical approach. The first is mis-classification of job stayers and job finders. The second is bias in
our measurement of the fraction of counterfactual wage cuts prevented by downward nominal wage
rigidity. Besides helping to correct for potential measurement error, the indirect inference procedure
provides a tight link between the reduced form empirical estimates and their counterparts in the
simulated data.
Table 1.5 displays the empirical moments that we target, along with the simulated moments that
result from the estimated model. All moments were calculated over the years 1980 to 1997. The
unemployment rate, u = .061, job-finding rate, f = .42, and median duration of unemployment,
D = 3.9 months, are targeted to CPS quarterly averages.24
The remainder of the target moments are derived from the PSID data.25 Wage rigidity for
incumbent workers (ŵrs = 0.53 for job stayers) and new hires (ŵrf = 0.36 for job finders), outlined
in section 3 above, are derived from the PSID data for 1980-1997. The difference between the
50th and 80th percentile of annual real log wage changes, Φ80 − Φ50, is estimated from the same
dataset to be about 11 percentage points. The moments αˆ and σˆlnw, are taken from the regression
lnwit = δ0 + δt + α lnwit−1 + uit, and are estimated as αˆ = 0.88 and σˆlnw = 0.19.
Although in principle all of the target moments can influence all of the estimated parameters, in
practice some of the target moments have a larger influence on some parameters than on others. The
Calvo parameters λE and λU are primarily determined by the wage rigidity target moments (λU is
also influenced by D). The parameters governing the productivity process, ψp and σp, are heavily
influenced by many of the targets, but ψp is directly characterized by αˆ, while σp is influenced more
by σˆlnw and D. The matching efficiency parameter A and the exogenous separations rate sx are
jointly determined by u and f . The cost of vacancy creation c and the flow unemployment benefit
b are characterized in part by the share of job surplus accruing to the worker.
The model matches the target moments u, f , αˆ, Φ80 −Φ50, and D reasonably closely. σˆlnw was
more difficult to match, which is perhaps unsurprising given the model’s lack of heterogeneity in job
amenities, investment in human capital, or match quality between jobs and workers. The estimated
23This condition ensures that the number of vacancies is efficient in an environment with flexible wages.
24The first two are from data constructed by Robert Shimer using the CPS. For more details, see Shimer (2012).
25We have also estimated this model using CPS-derived moments, with qualitatively similar results, but we highlight
the PSID data because it is a superior dataset for multi-year analysis of the evolution of wages (as opposed to a single
one-year change for each worker in the CPS).
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model matches the proportion of wage cuts prevented by wage rigidity for job finders ŵrf quite
closely, but produces an estimate for job stayers ŵrs that is lower than in the data.
Table 1.6 lists the estimated parameter values and their standard errors. The values for λE and
λU could not be determined to be different from each other at the 95th percent significance level, and
they correspond to a probability of experiencing rigid wages of greater than 90 percent per month.
The exogenous separations rate sx corresponds to a little more than half of the total separations
implied by the stationary unemployment and finding rates. The elasticity of the matching function
with respect to unemployed workers 1 − φ is 0.73, reflecting the “take-it-or-leave-it” nature of the
wage demands of workers in our model, which causes the majority of the match surplus to accrue
to the workers. Nonetheless, because workers realize that they may be unable to cut their wage
demands in the future, they moderate their wage demands in the present, leaving a non-trivial share
of the match surplus to the firm.26 The flow benefit of unemployment, b, is estimated to be quite low
at 0.29, or approximately 30% of the average wage, which helps to moderate their wage demands.
We estimate the following equation on our simulated data using individual-specific productivity
levels and wages:
∆ lnwijt = β0,j + β1,j∆ ln yijt + εijt, (1.19)
We divide workers into seven groups j: 1) all employed workers, 2) incumbent workers who were
employed in the previous month, 3) incumbent workers who have had continuous employment for
at least a year, 4) newly hired workers, 5) workers who were hired in the previous 3 months, 6)
unemployed workers, and 7) unemployed workers plus new hires. For each individual in each group
we record the most recent observed wage and productivity data in the event that they were not
employed in the prior period (e.g. newly hired workers). We use reservation wages in place of actual
wages for unemployed workers.
Table 1.7 shows the results of these regressions. Even with the high level of wage rigidity for job
finders estimated in our model, the regressions show that their wages are very responsive to their
productivity levels. The estimated elasticity of wages with respect to individual productivity is 0.86
for those who have been working for 3 months or less and 1.06 for new hires. Job stayers exhibit
a much lower wage elasticity of 0.36. The reservation wages of unemployed workers exhibit a wage
elasticity with respect to productivity of 0.33, much lower than for job finders, consistent with the
survey data of Krueger and Mueller (2014). When we estimate the regression combining unemployed
26This result is reminiscent of Elsby (2009), who argues that firms will respond to downward nominal wage rigidity
by compressing wage increases in good times.
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workers’ reservation wages with the observed wages of new hires, we estimate an elasticity of 0.42,
similar to the elasticity for all employed workers. We interpret these results as supporting our
contention that composition bias drives the apparent flexibility of the wages of new hires.
1.5.2 Dynamic Simulation
We use our estimated model to simulate a dynamic economy in which the aggregate productivity
level changes. We run 1,000 simulations of the economy containing 10,000 workers over 14 years
(168 months), discarding the first 10, and implement a permanent unanticipated productivity shock
(with equal probability of a 1 percent increase or a 1 percent decrease) in the first month of year 12.
The resulting simulated data represents 1,000 unique simulations of 12 months of base data and 36
months of data responding to the new permanent change in aggregate productivity. It is common
knowledge among all agents in the model that the shock will be permanent.
To facilitate computation, we use policy functions of firms and workers that correspond to the
eventual new steady state of the model immediately after the aggregate productivity shock hits.
Although the model is not fully dynamic in that sense, we argue that it approximates the transition
from one steady-state to another reasonably well for two reasons. First, following the logic of Shimer
(2005) and Pissarides (2009), because the hiring and job separation probabilities are quite large in
the model, the model will converge quickly to the new equilibrium after the aggregate shock.27
Additionally, employment relationships are on average long-lasting (46 months in the steady-state
model). Thus, firms’ hiring and workers’ wage-posting decisions in the new steady state are likely
to be a close proxy for their behavior in transition between states. We allow free entry of vacancies
to adjust to period-specific labor market flows.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show the impulse-response functions of unemployment, job finding, separa-
tions, wage demands, and productivity after positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity.
The unemployment rate behaves asymmetrically with regards to the productivity shocks, as a pos-
itive productivity shock leads to a smaller change in unemployment and a larger initial change in
wages than a negative productivity shock causes. This asymmetry results from wages being down-
wardly rigid but upwardly flexible in our model.
Figure 1.3 also decomposes unemployment into its various sources in the model. Exogenous
separations and rigidity-based separations are the proximate causes of a little less than half the
total unemployment in any given period, while rigid wages for unemployed workers and failures to
27In the baseline steady state, the job finding probability is 0.395 and the separation probability is .022, implying
a half-life for the deviation of unemployment from its steady state value of approximately 1.66 months.
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match with a vacancy account for the remainder. In the event of a negative shock, unemployment
due to rigid wages for both the employed and the unemployed increases significantly, but after the
initial period (during which many workers flow from the employed to unemployed states) the effect
of rigidity for unemployed workers dominates the effect of rigidity for employed ones. Therefore,
the finding rate has a slower adjustment process after a negative shock than the separation rate and
contributes more overall to the volatility of unemployment, as seen in the bottom panels of figure
1.4.
The observed labor productivity of job finders also responds asymmetrically to positive and
negative productivity shocks. Because idiosyncratic productivity evolves as a Markov process inde-
pendent of firm and employee behavior, these changes are driven entirely by compositional changes.
The new hiring spurred by a positive productivity shock brings more marginal employees into em-
ployment, leading to a gradual rise in average observed productivity. The wage rigidity for entrants
binds much more strongly for hires in the event of a negative shock than for a positive one, leading
to the composition of new hires with flexible wages rising dramatically in recessions. Thus, a neg-
ative shock leads to a rapid decline in average productivity among finders, from which it gradually
recovers.
This pattern is also evident in the wage demands of job finders versus all workers, shown in
the second row of figure 1.4. Real wages track the path of productivity closely, illustrating the
importance of wage flexibility in achieving full employment in an economic downturn. In the model,
unemployed workers, from whom the pool of new hires is selected, do not exhibit this kind of
flexibility on average. The ratio of the reservation wage to the idiosyncratic productivity level of the
unemployed, shown in the third row of figure 1.4, does not respond any more dramatically than the
wage-to-productivity ratio of employed workers. The gap between these ratios constitutes a major
barrier to unemployed workers’ chances of becoming re-employed.
We use the dynamic responses of the model to the aggregate productivity shocks to estimate
aggregate elasticities in the spirit of the empirical work in section 1.2. To measure the responsiveness
of aggregate wages in various subgroups of workers (all workers, new hires, and incumbent workers),
we randomly select a “survey month” from the quarter before the productivity shock and measure
the log change in average wages three months later. The upper panel of table 1.8 displays the
results of regressing these log changes in average wages on equivalent economy-wide changes in
average labor productivity or the unemployment rate. The elasticity of average wages with respect
to productivity is 0.68 for new hires (defined as workers who have found a job in the past three
months), significantly higher than it is for the working population as a whole, 0.30. Both of these
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elasticities compare closely with the elasticities found in Haefke et al. (2013). A similar pattern
holds for the elasticities of average wages with respect to the unemployment rate, as all workers
exhibit an elasticity of -0.16, versus -0.38 for job finders.
The bottom panel of table 1.8 demonstrates the effect of aggregate productivity and the un-
employment rate on individual wage changes by worker category. In this analysis a job finder is
defined as in the PSID data to be a worker who was unemployed or out of the labor force at any
point between surveys (typically 12 months). Job finders appear to be more responsive to changes
in labor market conditions, as indicated by the greater responsiveness of their wages to labor market
conditions. Including unemployed workers with job finders, as in the rightmost column, indicates
that part of that finding stems from composition bias. Workers who remain unemployed actually
exhibit more rigid wages, as measured by less elastic wage demands with respect to labor market
conditions, than workers who have maintained a job over the course of a year. This result again
stems from the negative selection with regard to wage flexibility associated with unemployed workers
in the model: unemployed workers are much more likely to have experienced rigid wages than the
working population.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that composition bias potentially accounts for the apparent flex-
ibility of the wages of newly hired workers. Newly hired workers are disproportionately likely to
have flexible wages relative to the pool of unemployed workers. Empirical analyses that omit the
reservation wages of the unemployed are prone to over-estimate the responsiveness of potential new
hires to macroeconomic conditions. Of course, because reservation wages are not regularly measured
in most economic datasets, this problem is inherently difficult to solve.
Using a model that explicitly ascribes high degrees of nominal wage rigidity to both incum-
bent workers and new hires, we are able to reconcile the dissonant statistics in the empirical data.
Furthermore, when we re-estimate the key empirical elasticities including the reservation wages of
unemployed workers along with the observed wages of new hires, the combined wages are noticeably
less responsive to labor market conditions.
Dynamic simulations point to the same conclusion. The simulated elasticities of wages with
respect to productivity closely match those in the U.S. data. A negative productivity shock leads
to a persistent increase in unemployment attributable to wage rigidity among the unemployed, but
the aggregate wages of new hires appear flexible because of selection effects. Therefore, we argue
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that nominal wage rigidity may account for a substantial share of the lower job finding rates during
recessions.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Technical Appendix on Data
This section of the appendix details the methods employed in Sections 2 and 3 to analyze nominal
wage rigidity and several real wage elasticities in PSID and CPS data.
1.7.1.1 PSID
We extracted employment, wage, and demographic information from each of the 1980-2013
family-level surveys for both the head of household and, where available, spouse. Because the PSID
uses primarily gender-based assignment of “head of household,” the primary earner of each family
might be either the head or the spouse according to that family’s particular economic situation.
These data were used to create an individual dataset, whereby each family-level entry was merged
onto the individual file to obtain an individual weight corresponding to each record. The resulting
file contained an average of 12,513 records per year, of which 69.1% were in the labor force and 5.9%
within that category were unemployed.
The hourly nominal wage for each respondent was calculated using their primary job only, as this
best suited our understanding of where wage rigidity manifests and is most economically relevant.
For hourly employees, we used their current reported hourly wage; for salaried workers, we used
their hourly wage when they reported it, but their more common response was to report pay over
a longer horizon such as “per month” or “per year” values. In these cases, we assumed 52 working
weeks per year, 40 hours per week to assign an hourly wage. We excluded all top-coded data, which
applies to hourly wages at or above 100 dollars per hour before 1993 and 1,000 dollars per hour from
1993 to 2013. Salaried employees are top-coded above 1 million dollars from 1980 to 1993 and 10
million dollars thereafter. We exclude from our analysis workers who earn significant money from
bonus or incentive-laden schemes.
In alternate specifications we use the PSID-generated hourly imputed wage, which adds the
earnings of the surveyed year (not the wages at the time of the survey) and divides by the imputed
hours spent working. This measure is not our preferred specification because it potentially involves
a host of relationships between each worker and his or her various employers, but as expected the
level of wage rigidity decreased modestly using the imputed wage relative to our preferred hourly
wage measure.
We calculate a tenure measure for all respondents who are currently employed. This measure is
used both to categorize workers as “job stayers” versus “job switchers” and as a regressor to control
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for job-specific productivity gains in our elasticity measures. The tenure variable is constructed
from a series of questions that ask how long the respondent has been with their current employer,
with the answers converted into years. Job stayers are then distinguished from switchers by the
time between surveys for each respondent; if the time elapsed between surveys is longer than the
reported tenure, the respondent is deemed a switcher (unless they have experienced a month or more
of non-employment). Otherwise, they are deemed a stayer. We clean the tenure variable according
to the procedure in Altonji and Williams (1997) by allowing tenure to increment by only one year
at a time for each respondent and re-setting it whenever the raw tenure measure indicates that the
respondent is either a switcher or a finder.
It is important to note that our definition of a job finder excludes some respondents who might
nonetheless be best described as such. In both our direct measure of wage rigidity and our estimates
of the various wage elasticities for job finders, we require that finders have a wage in both the previous
and current survey dates to be included in the sample. A respondent who was not working in the
prior year at the time of their survey date, but who nonetheless found a job in time for the current
year’s survey date, would be excluded from the analysis. Therefore, the job finder sample skews
towards those who had shorter spells of unemployment. In addition, the worker who experiences
multiple rounds of unemployment will find their current wages compared not against their most
recent job, but instead against the job held at the time of the previous survey.
We also attempted two other methods to categorize workers. In the first, we augmented the tenure
versus time elapsed between surveys comparison with the additional restriction that occupational
codes and industry codes could not switch from one year to the next. In the second, we directly
compared start dates with previous survey dates. We prefer the original method because a) responses
to length of time on the job were more frequently given (or perhaps known) than start dates, and
b) occupational codes and industry codes were not always comparable between years.
1.7.1.2 CPS
We use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series from 1989-2014. We restrict our analysis to
nonfarm, nonsupervisory workers between the ages of 25 and 60, so we exclude those whose occupa-
tional codes indicated they were either in “Executive, Administrative, and Managerial Occupations”
or “Management Related Occupations.” In addition, we exclude “Agriculture, Forestry, and Fish-
eries” occupational codes and evaluate only workers who were either paid by a flat salary or hourly
wage.
The top-coding of hourly and salaried workers is more severe in the CPS than in the PSID,
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so we impute earnings for top-coded workers with a Tobit distribution using year-specific Mincer
regressions that include a host of demographic attributes, including years of schooling, a quartic in
potential experience (age minus years of schooling minus 6), and race, gender, and married indicator
variables. Hourly employees are top-coded at 100 dollars per hour. For salaried workers, weekly
earnings are top-coded at 1,923 dollars per hour from 1989-2007 and 2,885 dollars thereafter.
We construct a measurement of hours for salaried workers that is equal to their typical hours
worked per week when available, substituted for hours worked in the past week if it is not. We then
trim the sample of outliers (totaling 1 percent of workers) to address concerns that the previous week
may have been atypical. To create an hourly wage for salaried workers, we divide weekly earnings
by weekly hours worked. Employees who were paid an hourly wage have it reported as such. Real
hourly wages are trimmed symmetrically at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles as well.
We exclude intervals that span 1995q3 and 1995q4 from our analysis because a change in sample
design renders us unable to match workers across that break.
We are unable to create an analog to job stayers and job switchers in CPS data, as we have
an incomplete employment history of each respondent. The limited employment history allows us
to categorize a worker as a job finder, but this definition is more restrictive than the one used in
the PSID. A worker who has a job in the outgoing rotation group but reports a month of non-
employment at any point in the three months prior is called a job finder in analysis performed with
CPS data.
As in the PSID, wage changes are the unit of analysis. As such, workers who were unemployed
in the outgoing rotation group either the first or second time do not have measurable wage changes
and are excluded from the analysis.
We weight each record in our sample according to the earnings weight variable EARNWT.
1.7.2 Measuring Wage Rigidity
This paper measures the fraction of counterfactual nominal wage cuts prevented by downward
nominal wage rigidity using the approach in Ehrlich and Montes (2015), which builds on the approach
of Card and Hyslop (1997). We present a brief overview here.
For each year t, estimate the distribution of observed wage changes using kernel density estima-
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tion.28 The estimate of the density at a point x is
fˆt(x) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
1
hj
K
(
x− xj
hj
)
(1.20)
where n is the number of observations, xj for j ∈ {1, ..., n} denotes a point in the observed distribu-
tion, hj is an adaptive bandwidth following the procedure of Van Kerm (2003), and K is a kernel
function.29 The specific kernel function used in the estimation is an Epanechnikov kernel of the form
K(z) =

3
4
(
1− z2) if |z| < 1
0 otherwise.
(1.21)
Denote the estimated distribution of observed wage changes as fˆobst , and let mt represent the median
wage change from year t− 1 to year t expressed in percentage points.
Next, construct a counterfactual wage change distribution fˆ cf for establishment i by averaging
the upper tails of the estimated observed distributions fˆobst across each year. In constructing the
average, first normalize the observed distribution for each year around its median.30 Then, reflect
the averaged distribution of the upper tails around the median each year.
The estimated proportion of wage cuts prevented by wage rigidity is then calculated by comparing
the implied proportion of counterfactual wage cuts with the number observed. For year t, denote the
proportion of wage cuts in the estimated observed wage change distribution as Fˆ obst (0
-).31 Denote
the proportion of wage cuts in the estimated counterfactual distribution as Fˆ cft (0
-). Let the sum
across years of these proportions be denoted Fˆ obs(0-) and Fˆ cf (0-). The measure of wage rigidity is
then the proportion of counterfactual wage cuts that are “missing” from the data and is calculated
as
ŵr = 1− Fˆ
obs(0-)
Fˆ cf (0-)
. (1.22)
28The estimation procedure focuses on wage changes within 15 percentage points of the median wage change each
year to avoid the influence of outliers.
29The global bandwidth is set to be 0.005. The adaptive bandwidths are calculated as the product of the global
bandwidth and a local bandwidth factor that is proportional to the square root of the underlying density function
at the sample points. The adaptive bandwidths have the property that their geometric average equals the global
bandwidth.
30In practice, in situations in which the observed median is negative and there are more observed wage cuts than wage
increases, recalculating the median by excluding observed wage changes between -0.25% and 0.25% helps to correct
for the “sweep-up” of counterfactual wage cuts to zero. This adjustment improves the accuracy of the procedure in
the Monte Carlo simulations discussed in Ehrlich and Montes (2015). Those years are then excluded when averaging
the upper tails, but are included when calculating the counterfactual wage cuts prevented by wage rigidity.
31The notation 0- indicates that the measured proportion does not include wage changes of exactly zero.
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Therefore, the wage rigidity estimate in equation (1.22) is time-invariant. ŵr has the natural in-
terpretation that a value of 0.25 implies that 25 percent of counterfactual nominal wage cuts were
prevented by downward nominal wage rigidity over the sample period.32
1.7.3 Computational Methods
We approximate the value functions for firms and workers using standard value function iteration
techniques. We approximate the productivity process using the method of Tauchen (1986), using
a productivity grid with 200 nodes. The nodes are spaced evenly in log terms, ranging from two
standard errors below the mean to two standard errors above. At the estimated values for persistence
of the productivity process ψp and innovation σp, the minimum grid value for p is 0.7469 and the
maximum value is 1.3387. We allow workers to choose reservation wages along an evenly-spaced
250-point grid with a minimum value of 0.7095 and a maximum value of 1.4057; these extrema
represent a range that encompasses that of p and extends an additional 5 percent in either direction.
The period for the model simulations is taken to be one month. We draw one set of random
shocks to use in every simulation. We simulate 2500 workers for 60 years, or 720 periods, discarding
the first 10 years (120 periods) for burn-in. We sample workers’ simulated wages annually, except
where noted otherwise in the text, for the purpose of measuring individual and aggregate elasticities
and wage rigidities.
In order to reduce the numerical error associated with the calculation of the standard errors in
table 6, we calculate the derivatives of the simulated moments µˆs(Θ) with respect to the model
parameters Θ using three different step sizes, 1%, 3%, and 5%, and take the average derivatives.
32Nothing in this procedure prevents ŵri from being negative. A value for ŵri of -0.25 would imply that there
are 25 percent more wage cuts in the data than would be predicted by the distribution of nominally positive wage
changes.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
PSID, 1980 to 2013
Variable All Respondents
Salaried 
Workers
Hourly 
Workers
Other 
Workers
Not 
Employed
Average Respondents per Survey Year 12,513 2,828 3,974 603 4,604
Average Age 43.0 39.8 37.7 41.6 50.0
Proportion Male 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.31
Average Job Tenure 6.7 7.3 6.3
Proportion of Job Stayers 0.64 0.69 0.60
Hourly Wage and Salary Income ($/hr.) 14.0 18.6 11.0
Labor Force Participation Rate 0.69
Unemployment Rate 0.059
Average Unemployment Duration (Weeks) 29.1
Notes: Job tenure, proportion of job stayers, and hourly wage and salary income under the category "All Respondents" include 
salaried and hourly workers.  Unemployment duration average among not employed who are in the labor force.
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Table 1.2: Elasticity of Real Wages with Respect to Unemployment in the PSID
All Workers -0.83 -0.50 -0.70 -1.07
(0.46) (0.48) (0.19) (0.58)
All Job Stayers -0.55 -0.23 -0.49 -0.76
(0.53) (0.50) (0.13) (0.49)
All Job Switchers -1.80 -1.70 -0.59 -3.35
(1.16) (0.93) (0.70) (0.96)
All Job Finders -1.82 -1.22 -1.65 -1.91
(0.36) (0.62) (0.79) (1.32)
Wage Measure current job current job average wage average wage
Sample Years 1980-1997 1980-2013 1980-1997 1980-2013
Notes: standard errors are clustered by the year level.  We use two measures of wages: 1) hourly wage in primary job 
at time of survey, and 2) average hourly wage in surveyed year across all jobs.  The job tenure variable is adjusted 
using the procedure in Altonji and Williams (1997).  We define finders as workers who are employed at the time of the 
survey date, but who responded that they had experienced unemployment at some point during the surveyed year.  
Stayers are defined similarly as continuously employed workers with the same employer between surveys.  Switchers 
are defined as continuously employed workers who are not with the same employer as the prior survey.  All includes 
stayers, finders, and workers who switched jobs between surveys.  Analysis includes only workers who are primarily 
hourly employees or salaried employees.
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Table 1.3: Elasticity of Real Wages with Respect to Productivity in the CPS
All Workers 0.18 0.33 0.33
(0.15) (0.20) (0.20)
All Workers Less Finders 0.32 0.31
(0.20) (0.20)
All Job Finders 0.94 0.59 0.75
(0.40) (0.63) (0.46)
Sample Years 1989-2006 1989-2006 1989-2013
Notes: Group wage changes are imputed as in Haefke, Sontag, and van Rens (2014). Standard 
errors are clustered by the year level for individual wage changes.  We define finders as workers 
who are employed at the time of the survey date, but who responded that they had experienced 
unemployment at some point during the prior 3 months.  Analysis includes only nonfarm, non-
management workers between the ages 25 and 60 who are primarily hourly employees or 
salaried employees.
Individual Wage Changes
Group Wage 
Changes
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Table 1.4: Measured Wage Rigidity in the PSID and CPS
PSID, 1980-2013 CPS, 1989-2013
Category of Worker Job Stayers Job Switchers Job Finders All Workers All Non-Finders Job Finders
All Workers (Salaried & Hourly) 52.7% 56.1% 36.4% 47.4% 47.5% 38.6%
(Std Dev) (0.4%) (2.0%) (1.2%) (0.3%) (0.3%) (1.5%)
Salaried Workers 48.7% 62.7% 40.0% 41.0% 40.8% 43.9%
(Std Dev) (0.7%) (3.7%) (4.8%) (0.7%) (0.7%) (6.8%)
Hourly Workers 55.1% 50.2% 36.6% 51.9% 52.2% 41.6%
(Std Dev) (0.5%) (1.8%) (1.3%) (0.4%) (0.4%) (1.6%)
Notes: Estimates of wage rigidity measures the proportion of counterfactual wage cuts missing from the observed wage change 
distribution, measured as described in Appendix A. Standard errors from 100 bootstrap replications in parentheses.
36
Table 1.5: Empirical and Simulated Moments
Target Moments Description/Source Target Values Model Values
u Average Monthly Unemployment Rate, CPS 1980-2007 0.061 0.056
f Average Monthly Job Finding Hazard Rate, CPS 1980-2007 0.432 0.395
Φ(.8)− Φ(.5) 80th Percentile-50th Percentile Real Log Wage Changes, PSID 1980-2013 0.112 0.094
wˆrf Wage Rigidity for Finders, PSID 1980-1997 0.364 0.394
wˆrs Wage Rigidity for Stayers, PSID 1980-1997 0.527 0.435
βˆ∆ lnw AR(1) Coefficient on Log Wages, PSID 1980-1997 0.881 0.915
σlnw Std. Dev. Of AR(1) Log Wage Innovations, PSID 1980-1997 0.188 0.045
D Mean Duration (months) unemployed, CPS 1980-2007 3.900 3.861
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Table 1.6: Model Parameters
Parameter Description Values (annual) Values (monthly) Standard Error
β Time Preference 0.950 0.996 –
pi Trend Nominal Wage Growth 0.040 0.003 –
p¯ Average Productivity Level (Normalized to 1) 1.000 1.000 –
1− φ Elasticity of Matching Function w.r.t. unemployment 0.730 – –
A Efficiency of Matching Function – 0.768 0.111
sx Exogenous Separations Rate – 0.014 0.002
ψp Persistence of Productivity Process 0.925 0.994 0.002
σp Standard Deviation of Productivity Shock – 0.017 0.001
b Flow Benefit of Unemployment – 0.290 0.410
c Flow Cost of Vacancy Posting – 0.158 0.216
λU Probability of Rigid Wages - Unemployed Worker 0.314 0.908 0.069
λE Probability of Rigid Wages - Employed Worker 0.414 0.929 0.291
Note: The standard errors for ψp, λU , and λE are reported for the annualized values.
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Table 1.7: Elasticity of Real Wages with Respect to Individual Productivity in Simulated Data
Worker Subgroup Elasticity
All Employed 0.424
(0.001)
Job Stayers 0.361
(0.001)
Job Finders 0.860
(0.003)
Unemployed Workers 0.331
(0.002)
New Hires and Unemployed Workers 0.423
(0.002)
Notes: A stayer is someone who was either employed in
the previous month (Stayers - 1 month) or continuously
employed during the past year (Stayers - 12 months). A
finder is anyone who is currently employed but was unem-
ployed in either the previous month (Finders - 1 month)
or previous 3 month (Finders - 3 months). Unemployed
wages reflect wage demands rather than observed wages.
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Table 1.8: Elasticity of Real Wages with Respect to Productivity, Unemployment (Simulated
Data)
Panel A: Aggregate Wages All Stayers Finders
elasticity of wage wrt productivity 0.30 0.28 0.68
standard error (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
elasticity of wage wrt unemployment -0.16 -0.16 -0.38
standard error (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Panel B: Individual Wages All Stayers Finders Unemployed All Finders
elasticity of wage wrt annual productivity 0.62 0.55 0.77 0.49 0.63 0.66
standard error (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
elasticity of wage wrt annual unemployment -0.45 -0.40 -0.56 -0.35 -0.46 -0.48
standard error (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: a stayer is someone who was continuously employed during the past year.  A finder is anyone who is currently employed but 
was unemployed at some previous point.  For the aggregate wages, a Finder was unemployed in the previous 3 months, as in Haefke, 
Sonntag, and ven Rens.  For individual wages, a finder was unemployed at any point in the previous year.
Including Unemployed
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Figure 1.1: Nominal Wage Changes in the PSID by Worker Category
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Figure 1.2: Nominal Wage Changes in the CPS by Worker Category
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Data range from 1989 to 2013.
Years 1995-1996 are excluded because of a sample design change in 1995 that hinders matching.
Graphs are truncated at -80 and 80 percent.
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Figure 1.3: Sources of Unemployment
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Figure 1.4: Labor Market Responses to Aggregate Productivity Shocks
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Figure 1.5: Nominal Wage Growth Among Job Stayers in the PSID by Year
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Figure 1.6: Nominal Wage Growth Among Job Switchers in the PSID by Year
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Graphs are truncated at -25 and 25 percent.
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Figure 1.7: Nominal Wage Growth Among Job Finders in the PSID by Year
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Figure 1.8: Nominal Wage Growth Among All Workers in the CPS by Year
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48
Figure 1.9: Nominal Wage Growth Among Workers, Excluding Finders, in the CPS by Year
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Figure 1.10: Nominal Wage Growth Among Job Finders in the CPS by Year
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Graphs are truncated at -60 and 60 percent.
50
Figure 1.11: 2-Year Nominal Wage Growth Among Job Stayers in the PSID by Year
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Figure 1.12: 2-Year Nominal Wage Growth Among Job Switchers in the PSID by Year
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Figure 1.13: 2-Year Nominal Wage Growth Among Job Finders in the PSID by Year
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CHAPTER II
Fiscal Policy
2.1 Introduction
The macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy are highly contested on both theoretical and empirical
grounds. Since the beginning of the Great Recession, and especially once interest rates reached
the zero lower bound, there has been a resurgence of interest in the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
The lack of consensus on how fiscal levers affect key macro-economic variables extends even to the
wisdom of employing countercyclical government spending policies to begin with. In this paper, we
use professional forecasts of government spending, revenues, output and prices to estimate both the
shocks to fiscal policy and to estimate the effects of changes in government spending on output and
prices via local linear projection.
There are two main empirical approaches for obtaining shocks to fiscal policy; either based on
Vector Autoregressions (VARs) or via narrative techniques. Standard VAR analyses follow the lead
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and apply a Cholesky decomposition to back out the shocks to fiscal
policy. The main advantage of VARs is their ability to capture complex patterns in the data with
very few structural assumptions. The standard narrative approach tends to follow the Ramey and
Shapiro (1998) “war dates” analysis where they created a dummy variable to capture government
spending shocks from news records of military buildups sourced from Business Week magazine.
The main advantage of the narrative approach is that the war dummy variable is exogenous to the
business cycle.
Both approaches have been criticized recently. The main disadvantage of a VAR is that, due to
the small set of included variables, the identified shocks are not truly exogenous innovations since
they do not adequately control for future policy actions even though this information might be pub-
This chapter is co-authored with Aditi Thapar.
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licly available. Ramey (2011) finds that changes in defense and non-defense spending are anticipated
by private agents a few quarters prior to the actual changes in spending. She finds that professional
forecasts Granger-cause VAR shocks, implying that VAR shocks are not true innovations. The main
disadvantage of the narrative approach is that the results are driven by the military buildup of World
War II and the Korean War, which leads to an extremely small sample of innovations.
In this paper, we use the forecast errors of professional forecasters to estimate fiscal shocks and to
estimate the dynamic effects of fiscal policy on output, private sector output, and prices. By doing
so, we implicitly gain the information set of the forecaster without the need to add more control
variables to our estimation. Professional forecasts contain more information than any viable VAR,
including information about future expected changes to policy levers. As a result, forecast errors are
“clean” of the kind of information that is readily predictable to economic actors but which is not
foreseen by, and may even be mis-attributed in, backwards-looking VARs. We obtain a government
spending multiplier between 1 and 1.6, with a slightly lower value using defense spending shocks.
The multiplier appears to be larger in more recent years, including the Great Recession. This is
consistent with the observation that crowding-out of private investment is less likely when interest
rates are at or near the zero lower bound.
Simultaneous estimation of output, spending, and (net) taxes requires several assumptions about
how to treat contemporaneous effects. As discussed by Perotti (2011) there are four key challenges
to any technique for the estimation of fiscal policy. First, typically VARs do not account for informa-
tion about future government policy that might be publicly available to agents, which he terms the
“anticipation problem”. Second, government spending is often assumed to be unrelated to contem-
porary nonfiscal variables in VARs for identification purposes (the “exogeneity problem”). Third,
most of the variance in government spending is driven by big war buildups, and these infrequent
instances drive the results (the “variance problem”). Fourth, government spending enters into other
economic variables in dynamic, variable ways, none of which are captured by simple negative wealth
effects a la the neoclassical depiction (the “externality problem”).
Empirical analysis of fiscal policy on the macro-economy has evolved over time. Below we
discuss some papers that are relevant to our approach to estimating the effects of fiscal policy.
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) focus on defense buildups in anticipation of the Korean and Vietnam
Wars, as well as the Carter-Reagan buildup in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as
potentially exogenous shocks to government expenditures. This approach reflects a careful treatment
of the exogeneity problem, as well as use of the variance in government spending. It sidesteps the
externality problem by focusing on an aspect of government spending that is unlikely to enter into the
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utility function in complicated ways. They find that total GDP increases but private GDP decreases
within two years of the initial buildup, reflecting a decrease in consumption and a spending multiplier
less than 1.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use a Structural VAR with real GDP, government spending (federal,
state, and local consumption and investment) and net taxes (receipts minus transfers to persons and
net interest). They identify the shocks as follows: taxes are taken to be affected contemporaneously
by output according to sources of taxes and various corresponding elasticities, summed together.
Government spending is assumed not to be contemporaneously affected. Use the “cleaned” tax and
spending data as instruments to estimate the contemporaneous effects of taxes and spending on
output. Then, they order the VAR so either the tax decision comes first or the spending decision
comes first (i.e., the spending increase doesn’t affect taxes, or the tax changes don’t affect spending).
They find the order is not very important to the results. They add a time trend for drift, and dummy
variables for the 1975q2 tax cut at each lag.
Blanchard and Perotti conclude that spending shocks lead to positive GDP effects, and tax
shocks lead to negative GDP effects. The stochastic trend leads to smaller effects on GDP from
spending and larger and more persistent negative effects on GDP from tax shocks. Their estimate
of the fiscal multiplier is about 1.3, implying higher consumption spending. Interestingly, they find
that investment decreases, which contrasts with their otherwise Keynesian results.
Perotti (2007) points out that use of dummies for government defense spending (Ramey-Shapiro
dates) subsumes all shocks into the fiscal shock category; using standard SVAR techniques from his
2002 paper, he isolates the effects of fiscal policy and finds that consumption actually rises (more
akin to either a Neo-Keynesian interpretation or non-separable utility of leisure and consumption).
Noting the timing issues of SVAR techniques and dummy techniques (relevant economic decision-
makers can foresee a spending increase or a tax increase), he also does analysis with annual data
but excludes pre-1929, which is often interpolated. He finds again that increasing G also increases
C. International comparisons yield the same results.
Romer and Romer (2010) look at the effect of tax changes on output growth using a narrative-
based approach. They note that the variation in taxes coincides with, and is often explicitly designed
in response to, many other factors in the economy which also affect growth. In order to account for
the simultaneity issues and omitted variable bias, they focus on a subset of tax changes that are a)
legislated, and b) appear to be implemented (based on the available narrative record) for reasons
that are independent of these other factors. The motivations they find for legislated tax cuts roughly
divide into the following categories: a) offset a change in government spending, b) offset other factors
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related to growth (e.g. counter-cyclical tax changes), c) address an inherited budget deficit, and d)
achieve a long-run goal (smaller government, increased fairness, faster growth). Factors a) and b)
are clearly correlated with other growth drivers, so exogenous tax changes are composed of c) and
d). The Romers’ data range from 1947 to 2007, and estimation includes 12 lags of the tax variable.
Their results are significant in that a 1 percent GDP increase in taxes leads to a 3 percent GDP
change in output over the next three years. Tax increases in response to a budget deficit have
much smaller effects than tax increases in category d), perhaps because of an interest rate response
(explanation ours). Romer and Romer also look at timing issues, finding that the biggest results
from implementation rather than announcement (in fact the announcement, when included with
implementation, has the opposite sign, but is about one-third the size), and they look at component
effects and find that investment has the largest response.
Ramey (2011a) contrasts VAR results with narrative-driven shocks to government spending,
in particular military spending. Both types find a positive multiplier of government spending on
output, but the VARs provide evidence that consumption and real wages rise, while papers using
the narrative-based approach generally find consumption falling. As a result, the multipliers are
usually higher for VAR approaches. She then finds that narrative-based shocks Granger-cause VAR
shocks, meaning that the VAR shocks are not true innovations. In addition, professional forecasts
Granger-cause VAR shocks as well. A more robust measure of expected changes in military spending
using news forecasts yields a multiplier of .6 to .8, approaching 1.1 when WWII is included as well.
Ramey also runs a VAR accounting for expectations by examining the one-period-ahead forecast
error in government spending growth based on the Survey of Professional Forecasters. She finds
that temporary rises in government spending do not stimulate the economy with this specification.
She calls this approach EVAR, and it attempts to address the concerns with her approach using
dummies to measure narrative-driven effects. The key concern with using the dummies is that they
absorb all the shocks of the periods in question, regardless of whether other shocks are occurring
simultaneously (such as the large tax increases during the Korean War).
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) create a smooth-transition VAR that measures the effect of
log real government purchases (federal, state, and local investment and consumption) and log real
government receipts (net of transfers to businesses and individuals) on log real GDP. The model
distinguishes between contemporaneous effects (via a covariance matrix) and dynamic effects via
lagged polynomials. They focus on the effect of government spending on output because they are
skeptical of the SVAR’s ability to truly exogenize the tax shocks (which appears to be a reference
to Romer and Romer (2010)). The switching regime is smooth so every period estimates both
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an expansionary and a contractionary parameter matrix. AG incorporate expectations into their
model by using the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) estimates of GDP growth, the Research
Seminar in Quantitative Economics (RSQE) forecasts of government revenues, and the Greenbook
forecasts of government spending. They note that the results of their baseline VAR yield a series
of residuals for government spending, and that same process based on forecasts of spending yields
a series of residuals that is NOT uncorrelated with the other series. They are positively correlated,
implying that some changes in government expenditures are predictable even given the information
structure in the VAR.
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko state that ideally they would be able to add the forecasts to the
VAR, but it doubles the size and halves the number of data points. They employ two different
approaches to deal with this in a tractable way. First, they create forecast errors of output, govern-
ment spending, and government receipts, and they use these errors to estimate the contemporaneous
responses of those variables, which they then allow to propagate in an impulse response function
that was previously estimated (under the assumption that all changes to these variables are unan-
ticipated). Second, they include a forecast error for government spending in the VAR directly (as
opposed to the full set of forecast errors) and accept the diminished sample size and slightly larger
VAR specification. They try this two ways, the first being an addition of the growth forecast, the
second being an addition of the forecast error in growth. Both yield higher estimates of the multiplier
for both expansions and recessions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 details our empirical approach and
contrasts it with those of the VAR and standard linear projection techniques. Section 2.3 describes
the forecast data from our two sources, the Federal Reserve and the University of Michigan’s Research
Seminar in Quantitative Economics, as well as the challenges of using forecast data, and assesses
the relative performance of professional forecasts versus those generated from VARs. In section
2.4 we highlight the basic empirical results of our methodology in terms of multipliers and impulse
response functions. We perform various robustness checks, including 1) using defense shocks as
exogenous drivers of government spending shocks, 2) altering our sample period, and 3) comparing
our empirical results with those using standard linear projection. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model
We begin by describing the basic framework of a Vector Autoregression (VAR) when applied
to the estimation of the effects of fiscal policy. Consider an n × 1 vector of economic variables,
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Xt = {Gt, Tt, Yt}, where Gt represents real government spending, Tt represents real tax revenues,
and Yt is real GDP, say. Xt is determined by the history of changes to its components ε according
to some functional form:
Xt = F (X0, εt, εt−1, ..., ε0). (2.1)
A structural VAR with p lags represents an approximate linearization of this relationship,
AXt = Γ + βZt + e
V AR
t , (2.2)
where A is a n×n matrix, Γ is a n× 1 vector, β is a n× p matrix, Zt ≡ (Xt−1, Xt−2, ..., Xt−p)′, and
eV ARt is a n × 1 vector of structural errors. The corresponding unstructured or reduced-form VAR
is defined and estimated as:
Xt =A
−1Γ +A−1βZt +A−1eV ARt
=Γ˜ + β˜Zt + ut. (2.3)
We can represent the reduced-form errors (ut) as the one-step ahead forecast errors generated by
the linear VAR model,
uV ARt = Xt − Et−1[Xt|Zt]. (2.4)
Note that in our approach we use professional forecast errors uft to replace VAR-generated forecast
errors uV ARt . In either case, the vector of residuals ut is typically used to identify the structural
shocks et. The structural errors in the VAR are related to the reduced-form errors by:
eV ARt = Au
V AR
t .
The structural shocks are recovered from the reduced-form errors by making assumptions on the
structure of the A matrix. A standard assumption in the VAR literature is to identify structural
errors by assuming that A is lower-triangular and that the structural shocks are independent. This
recursive identification assumption, also known as a Cholesky decomposition, implies that any con-
temporaneous covariance between variables is attributed to the variables ordered earlier in the VAR.
To obtain the impulse response functions, note that we can represent the linear VAR with p lags
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as an MA (∞) process as given by,
Xt+s =
∞∑
i=0
Die
V AR
t+s−i = D0e
V AR
t+s +D1e
V AR
t+s−1 + ....+Ds−1e
V AR
t+1 + ..... (2.5)
The s−step ahead forecast error from the VAR can be represented as,
Xt+s − EtXt+s =
s−1∑
i=0
Die
V AR
t+s−i = D0e
V AR
t+s +D1e
V AR
t+s−1 + ....+Ds−1e
V AR
t+1 . (2.6)
Since the eV ARt+s are assumed to be independent, Ds−1 can be interpreted as the effect of a structural
shock next period to the variable of interest s periods later.
We use the forecasts of professional forecasters to obtain empirical estimates of short- and long-
run fiscal multipliers via local projection methods, see Jorda´ (2005) and Thapar (2008) for two
applications of these methods.1 In this paper, we closely follow the basic approach developed in
Thapar (2008). Using professional forecasts, we can ignore estimation of equation 2.3 above and
calculate residuals directly, based on the insight that uft = Xt − Et−1[Xt|Ift−1] is the set of one-
step-ahead forecast errors, where Ift−1 is the information set available to forecaster f at time t− 1.2
One advantage of our approach is that the information set used to produce our forecasts
(
Ift−1
)
is presumably much larger than the information set of the VAR (Zt) . By construction, the VAR
forecasts can only include the information that is contained in the variables included in the system.
Forecast errors from professional forecasts can identify structural shocks εt directly via a Cholesky
decomposition. In our baseline case we include only taxes, T , government spending, G, and output,
Y , so Xt = (Gt, Tt, Yt)
′. The identification process of uncorrelated structural shocks εt = (ετt , ε
g
t , ε
y
t )
′
from the one-step-ahead forecast errors ut = (u
τ
t , u
g
t , u
y
t )
′ requires 3 restrictions. We adopt the
identifying method of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), so the (normalized) block:
uτt =α11ε
g
t + α12ε
y
t + ε
τ
t (2.7)
ugt =α21ε
τ
t + α22ε
y
t + ε
g
t (2.8)
uyt =α31ε
τ
t + α32ε
g
t + ε
y
t (2.9)
has two order restrictions, namely that α11 = 0 and α22 = 0.
3 The third restriction relates uτt to
1Ramey (2016) summarizes developments in the literature on the propagation of macroeconomic shocks.
2In the VAR above, Ift−1 = Zt and Et−1[Xt|Zt] = Γ˜ + β˜Zt, or the best linear fit in a mean squared error sense.
3The choice of α11 = 0, which assumes that shocks to government spending do not affect taxes in the contempo-
raneous quarter, is relaxed and substituted with an alternative restriction α21 = 0 without any significant change in
results for Blanchard and Perotti. We also perform an alternative analysis with this substitute ordering and reach a
similar conclusion.
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uyt based on a weighted set of short-run elasticities between taxes and output. Our estimate of ητ,y,
the within-quarter elasticity of taxes with respect to output, is 1.18 for gross federal receipts during
the sample period for which we have GB forecasts (1978 to 2010) and 1.89 for net federal, state,
and local receipts during the sample period for which we have RSQE forecasts (1994 to 2015). A
detailed derivation of these values is available in an appendix at the end of the paper, labeled section
2.7. The net effect of this restriction is the creation of a cyclically adjusted tax shock.
By using forecast errors directly, we gain several advantages. First, our errors are not the
product of the limited information set of a VAR, {Xt−1, Xt−2, ..., Xt−p}, but rather include all the
information known to the forecasters at time t − 1. Second, by expanding the system of equations
2.7-2.9 to include other macroeconomic variables of interest (e.g. inflation or the instrument of
monetary policy), we can generate additional impulse responses or simply control for more shocks
and better isolate the effect of shocks to the existing set of variables.
Increasing the block of equations above is possible in a SVAR format as well; the number of
required identifying restrictions r simply increases with the number of variables n according to
r = n(n−1)2 , just as in our process above. A small advantage might be conferred to the forecast
error method in that some identifying restrictions could seem more plausible within the context of a
larger information set. The more practical problem in a VAR setting, however, is that the number
of degrees of freedom shrinks much more rapidly. For a VAR with 4 lags, adding a 4th variable
increases the number of coefficients to be estimated in the first stage alone from 4 × 32 = 36 to
4 × 42 = 64, while adding a 5th variable increases the number of coefficients to 4 × 52 = 100. By
dispensing with a linear best fit model to generate one-step-ahead forecast errors, we are potentially
able to obtain more precise estimates of the relationship between structural shocks and forecast
errors with a smaller data set.
Instead of tracing out an impulse response iteratively through the same linear model, we project
our forecast errors at each of the N horizons for which they exist, t+ 1 to t+N , onto our structural
shocks:
Xt+s − Et−1[Xt+s|Ift−1] = c+ βsεt + θt+s for s = 1, 2, ..., N, (2.10)
The impulse response s periods into the future of the jth element of ε on the ith element of X is
the (i, j)th element of βs. The system of N equations in 2.10 can be estimated individually via least
squares using a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix.
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2.2.1 Multipliers
The impulse response functions estimated above provide us the elasticity of output with respect
to government spending at various horizons. To convert the elasticities to multipliers, we follow
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and calculate multipliers as the integral or present value of the response
of GDP or private GDP divided by the integral response of government spending.4 The present value
multiplier (φ) at horizon s is given by
φs =
∑s
i=0 (1 + r)
−i
βY,i∑s
i=0 (1 + r)
−i
βG,i
× Y
G
(2.11)
where βj,i refers to the impulse response of variable Y = {GDP, private GDP} at horizon i =
1, 2, ..., N and r is the real interest rate. The real interest rate is assumed to be the average real
interest rate over the relevant sample period.
2.2.2 Comparison of Projection Methods
Our approach differs significantly from a VAR, as described in detail above, but also somewhat
from Jorda`’s popular local projection method, which uses the actual data (as opposed to forecast
errors) to estimate impulse response functions. As discussed in Ramey (2016), given a series for the
structural shocks one can obtain impulse response functions via Jorda`’s local projection method by
estimating a sequence of regressions given by,
Yt+s = b
Y,se1t + control variables+ ηt+s for each s = 1, 2, ...,H, (2.12)
where Yt+s is the variable of interest, say GDP, at time t + s, b
Y,s is the impulse response of Y
at horizon s to a e1t shock in period t. This method can be applied to shocks obtained from any
source, such as a Cholesky decomposition, reading news about defense contracts, or through excess
returns on the stocks of defense contractors, to name a few. The control variables are added to
account for information that is available in period t, when the fiscal policy shock hits the economy.
Jorda`’s local projection method is similar to the VAR projection in equation 2.5. Researchers using
this technique typically add various control variables to account for information available to policy
makers at the time of the forecast.
One of the main advantages of our approach to calculating impulse response functions, in equation
4The impulse response at horizon s, βs, is the percent response of Y to a one percentage point shock to Y , so
βs =
dY/Y
dG/G
.
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2.10, is that by using the forecast errors of professional forecasts we have automatically controlled for
a larger information set than can be included by adding a small subset of variables into the above
estimation equation. Note our projection in equation 2.10 is similar in nature to the projection
produced by a VAR in equation 2.5, with one major difference. The expectations in the VAR
projection are based only on the information set of the variables included in the VAR system whereas
the information set of professional forecasters includes all the information that is available to the
forecasters at the time of the forecast. Asymptotically equations 2.12 and equation 2.10 should lead
to the same results, however we should expect to see efficiency gains since our approach (equation
2.10) controls for a larger subset of information. As Ramey (2016) summarizes, “Because the Jorda`
method for calculating impulse response functions imposes fewer restrictions, the estimates are often
less precisely estimated and are sometimes erratic.” We test this proposition in section 2.5.3 and
find that although the point estimates from both approaches are similar, there are strong efficiency
gains from using our methodology.
2.3 Data
In this section, we describe the data that are used in this paper. To implement our approach we
need forecasts (and forecast errors) of GDP, government spending and tax and transfer information,
all on a quarterly basis. We use quarterly forecasts from 2 separate sources, the Federal Reserve
Board’s Greenbook (GB) forecasts and the University of Michigan’s Research Seminar in Quanti-
tative Economics’s (RSQE) quarterly forecasts. The GB forecasts, which are made public 5 years
after they are created, span from 1966 to 2010 with the relevant data at quarterly intervals. RSQE
data, on the other hand, are available from 1983 to 2015.
2.3.1 Greenbook Forecasts
The Greenbook is the colloquial name given to the official report titled “Current Economic and
Financial Conditions – Summary and Outlook” that is produced by the research staff at the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. This report is prepared for the Federal Open Markets
Committee (FOMC) prior to every FOMC meeting. It includes the forecasts of the US economy
and is available to the FOMC members six days prior to every scheduled meeting.
The Greenbooks are publicly available but with a six year lag, which constrains the end of
our sample period to the end of 2010. Although the Greenbook forecasts are available from 1966
onwards, it was only beginning in 1975 that the forecast horizon was extended to be a minimum
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of four quarters ahead in every forecast. The maximum forecast horizon was increased from five
quarters ahead to seven quarters ahead in 1979. Eight quarter ahead forecasts are available beginning
in 1988. Currently we have data beginning in 1978 but we plan to extend the sample to include the
1975-78 period.5
Some of the forecasts of the variables of interest are available in levels, others in growth rates,
while a select few are in both levels and growth rates. Still others, like GDP and the GDP deflator,
which used to be available in both levels and growth rates began to be published only in growth
rate terms beginning in 2005. In this paper, we decided to use the growth rates for all the variables
of interest.
The Greenbook forecasts estimate the growth of future real government expenditures on con-
sumption and investment, including federal, state, and local expenditures. We use this set of esti-
mates as our measure of government spending.
Our expected growth rate of government receipts is a gross measure, for want of forecast data
on transfers from the government to persons. In addition, state and local receipts are not included
in the Greenbook forecasts, so all analyses of Greenbook data that include taxes/receipts are using
forecast errors of federal gross receipts, indexed by the GDP deflator.
We are interested in estimating the cumulative effects of government spending on the variables
of interest at different horizons. Since we are working with growth rates rather than levels, for the
purpose of estimating impulse response functions and multipliers we calculate cumulative growth
rates for each variable of interest, gxt+s =
Xt+s
Xt
, and project forecast errors of cumulative growth
rates, gxt+s − Et−1[gxt+s|Ift−1] onto our shock series at each s = 1, 2, ...,H.
2.3.2 RSQE Forecasts
RSQE produces quarterly forecasts at regular intervals that have shifted slightly over time. While
its current practice is to publish detailed write-ups of its forecasts in March, May, September, and
November, in the past its August set of projections was its featured (and sometimes only) 3rd-quarter
forecast. In addition, the June forecast was more frequently published in the recent past than the
one in May. We draw one forecast from each quarter between 1994 and 2015, according to the
following conventions: 1) we use the March, May, and November forecasts throughout our analysis,
and 2) we use the August forecast from 1983-2007, and the September forecast from 2008-2015.
5Until 1974, the forecasts for the first ten months of the year were only available for the current calendar year,
while in the last two months each year the forecast horizon was extended to the next calendar year. As a result of this
forecasting convention, we have forecasts of between one and four quarters ahead depending on the quarter. Due to
the short forecast horizon of the data in the 1966-74 sample, we focus on the post-1974 sample period for this paper.
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The horizon for RSQE forecasts also varies over time. From 1994-1995, forecasts before November
included projections through the end of the current year and also the next two years, between 10
and 12 quarters in total (counting the projection for the current quarter, which we do not use).
November included an additional year, giving us 13 quarters of projections (and 12-quarters-ahead
forecast errors, excluding the current quarter). Beginning in 1996 and extending to 2011, the August
forecast included the third full year of projections. From 2012 to the present, RSQE forecasts include
between 13 and 16 quarters of projections. The recentness of this change, however, means that we
have a 15-step-ahead forecast error for only one quarter, the March 2012 projection for 2015q4.
RSQE forecasts are available in the more recent years, but data from 1952-1982 were destroyed
in a fire. Published results, however, are available for 1952-1982 and have never been assembled;
they comprise a unique (albeit annual) data set that may be promising if we supplement our existing
research agenda with a modified approach to utilize the sparser data (for example, we do not have
net government receipts in the published results), shorter horizon, and annually aggregated format.
The RSQE measure of government spending that we employ is the same as for the Greenbook
data: total real government expenditures on consumption and investment. For receipts, we construct
a measure of real government net receipts, which includes state and local receipts as well as federal
and non-federal transfers to persons (excluding interest payments). As with Greenbook forecasts,
we work with cumulative forecast errors in growth rates.
2.3.3 Real-Time versus Current-Vintage Data
When using forecast data, the primary issue in obtaining forecast errors is the choice of whether
to use the data in its current vintage or to use the value of the variables that were available around
the time the forecasts were made (real-time data). Many studies using forecast data tend to use
real-time data to construct forecast errors. In this paper we do not follow this convention for two
main reasons. First, government spending estimates tend to get revised over time much more than
most other variables, and second, since we are working with cumulative forecasts it is difficult to
consider real-time data. We describe the issues in detail below.
The main argument for basing forecast errors on real-time data is that calculating forecast errors
based on the current vintage might artificially inflate the forecast errors and incorrectly attribute
definition changes as shocks. For example, in 2013 the definition of GDP was expanded to include
intellectual property. A forecaster in 1980, however, would likely have forecast GDP based on the
definition of GDP that was used in 1980. The main argument against using real-time data, and
instead using the current vintage data, is that the purpose of forecasting is to obtain the true value
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of a variable. The most recent versions of data, with all the revisions, are more likely to represent
the true value of the variable. Here too, however, there is a problem. Older data, which have been
revised more, are likely to have larger errors while newer data that are more closely related to the
current definitions will have smaller errors.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes three estimates for the NIPA accounts. The
advance (first) estimate, the second estimate, and the third estimate are published one, two, and
three months respectively after the end of any given quarter. Table 2.1 compares the currently
available (current vintage) data with real-time data. We report the correlations between the current
vintage data and real-time data as it existed one and two quarters after the end of any given quarter.
Most of our real-time data were collected from the Greenbook dataset, which along with forecasts
also contain the data available in the past few quarters. Depending on the exact date of the FOMC
meeting, the one-quarter-old real-time data is either the advance or second estimate, while the
two-quarter-old is the third estimate. Every summer the BEA conducts an annual revision of the
data over the past three calendar year and approximately every five years the BEA conducts a
comprehensive revision. The third estimate is changed any time the BEA makes major changes.
The last column of table 2.1 contains the correlations of the current-vintage data for all the
variables of interest. As expected, the two-quarter-old real-time data is slightly more correlated
with the current data than the one-quarter-old real-time data. For most of our variables, the
correlation between the two-quarter-old real-time data and the current vintage data is 0.8 or higher.
The one notable exception is government spending, the most important variable in our analysis,
with a correlation coefficient of only 0.6 with current data.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the quarterly annualized growth rate of government spending and GDP.
The first issue with using real-time data as the proxy for the actual data in constructing forecast
errors can be observed in the middle panel of the left column of the figure. Government spending
tends to be revised even after the third estimate. The period between 1981 and 1988 appears to be
responsible for most of the subsequent revisions, and the current vintage data are much less volatile
than in the initial telling. GDP growth rates, however, are more similar between the real-time series
and the current vintage data. We consider the revisions to government spending in the pre-1990
period to be a serious concern with using real-time data to construct forecast errors.
The second issue with using real-time data is a result of the analysis in this paper being based
on growth rates of macroeconomic variables as opposed to levels, due to the restrictions of the
Greenbook dataset as discussed above. Our use of cumulative growth rates of our variables of
interest creates a dilemma over how to calculate forecast errors when using real-time data. The
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projected growth rate between today and five quarters ahead can be easily calculated from the
Greenbook and RSQE datasets. To obtain the forecast error, however, we need a measure of the
actual growth rate between today and five quarters from today. It is not clear at all, even in theory,
which real-time data are appropriate to use, especially if an annual or comprehensive revision occurs
between the forecast and the realization of the variable of interest.
Due to the issues with revisions to government spending and complications due to using cu-
mulative growth rates, as described above, in this paper we use current data to construct forecast
errors.
2.3.4 Comparison of Forecast Errors
In this section we compare the various performance measures of the Greenbook and RSQE
forecasts of GDP, government spending, and receipts. We compare their forecast errors with several
VAR specifications, all of which include 4 lags of each variable. The VAR specifications are chosen
to highlight key points. There are two sets of choices involved. The first choice is whether to use
the current vintage data or to use real-time data. The second choice is whether to estimate only
one VAR over the entire model, or to estimate a rolling VAR, where the VAR is estimated every
period and its predictions (Yt+i, Gt+i, Tt+i)
′ are based on its simulated values of (Yt+j , Gt+j , Tt+j)′
for j = 1, 2, ..., (i− 1) rather than the actual values of those variables.
We obtain one- to eight-quarter-ahead forecasts, and forecast errors, from four VARs (see table
2.2). The first VAR specification (VAR1) uses current vintage data and is estimated only once
over the entire sample period. This specification benefits from consistent definitions over the entire
sample and from using the entire sample period to estimate the best linear relationship between
the variables. The second VAR specification (VAR2) also uses the current vintage data, but it
is estimated on a rolling basis and without access to the current period’s output, receipts, and
government spending (which would not be known at the time a forecast must be made). The third
VAR (VAR3) is estimated only once over the entire sample period using our real-time data set. The
fourth VAR specification (VAR4) is a rolling VAR that is estimated using real-time data, which most
closely mimics the forecasts that would be made by a professional forecaster. Ex ante we expected
VAR1 to perform the best, since it uses current vintage data and is estimated only once over the
entire sample, and VAR4 to perform the worst.
Table 2.3 compares the mean error, root mean-squared error (MSE), and mean absolute error
(MAE) of each forecast series over two sample periods, 1983-2010 (the sample common to the
available Greenbook and RSQE forecasts) and 1990-2010. The latter sample period is included due
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to the aforementioned irregularities of government spending growth in the real-time data versus the
current-vintage data during the 1980s.
Unsurprisingly, VAR1, which uses current vintage data and is estimated only once over the entire
sample period, is the best performing of the VARs by most measures. Its MAE and MSE are lower
for all three variables over the short run for both sample periods. The interesting exception is VAR4,
which although it generally does not outperform the first specification, manages to equal and even
beat VAR1 in GDP forecast errors for selected periods.
The two forecast series significantly outperform the VAR specifications using real-time data for
both spending and receipts. The one-period-ahead forecast errors for the Greenbook and RSQE
series of government spending, respectively, have a MSE of 4.19 and 3.56 between 1983 and 2010,
compared with 5.31 and 4.98 for the two VARs. They do even better in receipts; with MSEs of 10.43
and 10.88 respectively, they outperform all 4 VARS, the best of which registers a MSE of 13.68. In
GDP, they outperfom all 4 VARs in the short run, with the Greenbook forecasts performing the
best at a MSE of 2.19 one period ahead. Over the longer term, this advantage attenuates in GDP
and quarterly growth rates do not appear to be more accurate 5 to 8 periods ahead than the best
performing VAR specifications.
In the 1990-2010 sample period, the Greenbook and RSQE forecast errors exhibit lower MSE
in all three variables than all VAR specifications, and lower MAE in government spending and
government receipts.
Table 2.3 also shows the effect of averaging the GB and RSQE forecasts, which improves perfor-
mance even further. The average of the Greenbook and RSQE forecasts has the lowest MAE and
MSE of all specifications for the larger sample period with the exception of government spending
compared with the current vintage VARs. In the later sample period, it outperforms everywhere
except in later periods for GDP.
While the Greenbook appears to have slightly better performance than RSQE in its GDP fore-
casts, the further-ahead forecast errors do not perhaps tell a complete story; a forecast’s performance
over a longer horizon is probably better described by its cumulative error than its errors in each
period. Table 2.4 compares the GDP forecasts for the two institutions based on cumulative forecast
errors. The performance is much closer than in table 2.3; the Greenbook performs slightly better
measured by MSE, while RSQE outperforms based on MAE.
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2.4 Results
This section discusses the main results from the estimation of the effects of government spending
shocks on key macroeconomic variables in the United States in the past 30 years. All results shown
are based on projections onto structural errors derived by ordering (cyclically-adjusted) taxes first,
government spending second, and output last. Switching the order of government spending and
taxes has minimal impact on the impulses, standard errors, or multipliers.
The top panel of figure 2.2 shows the impulse response of real GDP obtained from a baseline
VAR that includes the log levels of government spending, government receipts, real GDP. This small
subset of variables is the standard set of variables that are used in the literature. The bottom panel
shows the impulse response of the deflator from a VAR that includes the GDP deflator in addition
to the variables in the baseline VAR. Figure 2.2 is presented to provide a baseline comparison for
our approach. It is the only figure where the confidence bands are the 68% confidence intervals,
as is standard in the VAR literature. The impact response is a 0.26 percentage point change in
output, which then accumulates to an increase of 1.4 after eight quarters. The results are significant
at the 10% level, for output, only for the first two quarters. For the GDP deflator, we find that
prices decrease on impact and continue decreasing over our forecast horizon. The results here are
significant at the 10% level.
Figures 2.3-2.5 show our baseline results of the effects of a government spending shock to GDP,
private spending, and prices, estimated using equations 2.10 above. The results should be interpreted
as the cumulative effect to the variable of interest of a 1 percentage-point shock to real government
spending, estimated from the first available set of forecasts for each organization through 2010
(1978-2010 for Greenbook, 1983-2010 for RSQE).
In each figure the top panels report the estimated impulse response function using the Greenbook
dataset while the bottom panels report the impulse response function for the RSQE dataset. The
solid lines are the impulse responses, while the dashed lines are the 90% confidence intervals (solved
analytically). Although the convention in the VAR literature has converged to report only one
standard deviation bands (68% confidence intervals), our approach allows us to work with conven-
tional measures of significance. As discussed in the data section above, the limitation to the number
of horizons for which we can estimate impulse responses is based on data availability. Greenbook
results are shown out to 8 quarters while the RSQE results are shown out to 12 quarters, which
represents the maximum horizon of each dataset.
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse response function of real GDP. We project GDP cumulative forecast
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errors on government spending shocks according to the system of equations 2.12, where the first
column uses εt = ε
G
t and the second column uses εt = (ε
T
t ε
G
t ε
Y
t )
′. We find that under both
specifications GDP increases immediately by about 0.2 percentage points with both Greenbook and
RSQE data before gradually rising. The Greenbook estimates are significantly different from zero
for most periods, while the RSQE results indicate a smaller response (near 0 in the short term) with
a larger confidence interval.
Figure 2.4 shows the effect of a 1 percentage-point government spending shock on private GDP,
calculated as GDP minus government spending. Not surprisingly, given the results shown in figure
2.3, the impulse response derived from Greenbook estimates is mostly positive, beginning near zero
for the first two periods before picking up, while the RSQE response function is more ambiguous.
The IRF from RSQE forecasts remains negative for 7 quarters before becoming positive in the first
specification, and negative for the first 10 quarters in the second specification. None of the results
for either impulse response functions are statistically significantly different from zero. The lack of a
significant response of private spending to a government spending shock, as well as the initial fall in
private spending, has been found in other work by Ramey (2013).
Finally, in Figure 2.5 we note an interesting effect of government spending on prices. Increased
spending appears to lead to a decrease in the GDP deflator. The qualitative result is the same using
both Greenbook and RSQE forecasts (and for both specifications) and is statistically significant for
most quarters after a shock. This “fiscal price-puzzle” has also been reported by Canova and Pappa
(2007) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
Our estimates of the government spending multiplier are presented in tables 2.5 and 2.6. Using
Greenbook forecasts imply that, over the 1978-2010 sample period, a government spending shock
yields a fiscal multiplier of just under 1 on impact. The multiplier rises to 1.2 one year after the
shock and 1.4-1.5 six quarters after the shock. The government spending fiscal multiplier on private
GDP is near zero or slightly negative in table 2.5, before beginning to rise in the later quarters.
Table 2.6 presents the same results based on RSQE data for the 1983-2010 sample period. The
RSQE multipliers, in contrast to the Greenbook multipliers in table 2.5, are less than 1 for GDP
until 10 quarters after the shock. In addition, the private GDP fiscal multiplier is negative through
the same timeframe. These results are consistent with the lower impulse responses in the RSQE
panels of figures 2.3 and 2.4.
70
2.5 Robustness
In this section we exploit the flexibility of our methodology to discuss the results of various
robustness exercises. We begin by discussing the impulse response functions and multipliers using
shocks to federal government spending on defense. Then we examine the importance of sample
period choice on our results. Finally, we compare the results in our baseline projections with the
Jorda` method.
2.5.1 Defense Shocks
Much of the multiplier literature emphasizes the role of defense spending shocks on GDP, as
defense spending is in many cases orthogonal to current macroeconomic conditions (see Ramey and
Shapiro (1998)). Our approach, in theory, avoids several of the pitfalls that lead researchers to focus
on defense shocks; nevertheless, we examine the effect of defense shocks on GDP, private spending,
and the GDP deflator here for comparison with our baseline approach.
We project forecast errors of our variables of interest on government spending shocks instru-
mented by defense shocks, defined according to the same process as government spending shocks.6
We do not have defense spending projections in Greenbook forecasts until 1981q4, so our sample
period spans from 1981q1-2010q4. We do not have defense spending in our RSQE forecasts for
1983-1993, so we do not show the results for RSQE data here.
Figure 2.6 compares our baseline projections with those from instrumenting government spending
with defense shocks. In each case, instrumenting for defense shocks mutes the baseline result. The
impulse response function for GDP begins at a similar level and rises slightly more slowly than in the
baseline, but it is no longer statistically significantly different from 0 at the 90 percent significance
level. For private GDP, the response is almost indistinguishable from 0 for most quarters after a
shock. Finally, the GDP deflator falls by less than would otherwise be expected, and it borders on
statistical significance in a comparison with no effect.
Table 2.7 shows the multipliers of GDP and private GDP based on the projections above. For
GDP, the multiplier stays in the range of .7 to .8 for most of the sample before creeping up in later
periods. Private GDP holds at a negative value until the very end, in accordance with the impulse
responses shown in figure 2.6.
6When government spending is ordered first, the forecast error is the structural shock. When government spending
is ordered second, which is the result shown, the structural shock is derived from equation 2.8.
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2.5.2 Sub-sample
An interesting question is whether or not the efficacy of fiscal policy changed during the great
moderation. The advantage of our approach, especially relative to a VAR-based analysis, is that since
we treat all expectations and forecast errors as data it is easier for us to answer such questions over
small samples. We discuss the effects of a government spending shock on GDP with progressively
more recent sample periods and show results excluding the Great Recession.
Figure 2.7 compares the effects of government spending shocks on GDP, private spending, and the
GDP deflator over the different samples. Qualitatively, the results are very similar to our baseline.
The initial impact on GDP is close to one-for-one, the results are statistically significant at most
horizons, and the multiplier increases over the forecast horizon. Quantitatively, the main difference
in the results stems from the fact that the impulse responses for both GDP and private GDP rise
as we exclude earlier data. The exclusion of the Great Recession from our sample period, shown in
the lower right quadrant of each figure, lowers the estimated impulse response, implying that the
multiplier during that period was quite strong. This reinforces the mainstream belief that multipliers
are most pronounced when interest rates are low, precluding crowding out.
2.5.3 Comparison to Jorda` Projections
In section 2.2.2 we compared our method with that of Jorda` (2005). The main difference, again,
between our approach and Jorda`’s local projection approach is that we project structural shocks
on s-period ahead forecast errors (Yt+s − EtYt+s), whereas the standard method involves projecting
shocks onto the s-period ahead value of the variable, say Yt+s. Here we discuss the effects of the
two different estimation techniques.
Figure 2.8 compares the impulse response functions for GDP, private GDP, and the GDP deflator
based on the two methodologies. While both methodologies have similar paths for GDP and private
GDP, as expected our impulse responses have greater significance. For the GDP deflator, we get
a strong, and statistically significant, negative response of prices to a government spending shock
whereas projecting onto current data implies a negligible, and statistically insignificant, response of
prices.
A well documented problem in the literature on estimating the effects of macroeconomic shocks
is the limited information set of a VAR-based analysis. The advantage of our approach is that
by using forecasts of professional forecasters, we can control for a variety of information that is
available at the time that a shock hits the economy. We do not need to include extra variables in
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our estimation. The main advantage of Jorda`’s projections, over our approach, is the possibility of
estimating impulses for a longer horizon.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper uses Federal Reserve and a non-profit forecasting organization’s forecast errors to
estimate the effect of changes in government spending on output. It adapts a local linear projection
methodology to estimate IRFs and multipliers that is robust to compounding errors due to misspec-
ification of the data generating process. We obtain multipliers that are stronger than 1 under most
specifications, with 1.6 being our best estimate of the multiplier about 2 years after a government
spending shock. Multipliers utilizing defense spending are slightly smaller. The government spend-
ing multiplier appears to be increasing over time, and the Great Recession was likely an era in which
the spending multiplier was quite high.
Forecast errors from the Greenbook and RSQE projections perform better on a variety of metrics
than simple VAR residuals. In addition, the projection of cumulative growth rate errors onto our
shock series allows us to obtain similar but much more precise estimates to a similar method of
projecting the growth rates themselves onto the shocks (with additional controls). This performance
improvement allows us to maintain that our estimate of IRFs for output are greater than 0 at the 90
percent confidence interval for two years. The drawback of this methodology is that we are unable
to make longer-run estimates of the multiplier or IRF.
Finally, we have identified what appears to be a counterintuitive (but nonetheless previously
documented) price response to government spending shocks. The GDP deflator falls after spending
increases, contradicting the standard understanding of how demand-side shocks act to raise prices.
Further work is necessary to uncover the exact mechanism through which prices fall (or appear to
fall).
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Figure 2.1: Real-Time versus Current-Vintage Growth Rates
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Figure 2.2: IRFs in Response to 1 Percentage Point Increase in G
SVAR Performance, 1978-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ch
an
ge
 (P
erc
en
tag
e P
oin
ts)
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
GDP
68% confidence interval
Quarters after shock
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ch
an
ge
 (P
erc
en
tag
e P
oin
ts)
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
GDP Deflator
68% confidence interval
75
Figure 2.3: IRFs of GDP in Response to 1 Percentage Point Increase in G
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Figure 2.4: IRFs of Private GDP in Response to 1 Percentage Point Increase in G
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Figure 2.5: IRFs of GDP Deflator in Response to 1 Percentage Point Increase in G
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Figure 2.6: IRFs in Response to 1 Percentage Point Increase in G
Greenbook Data, 1982-2010
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Figure 2.7: IRFs in Response to 1 Percentage Point Increase in G
Greenbook, Different Sample Periods
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Figure 2.8: IRFs in Response to 1 Percentage Point Increase in G
Greenbook Data, 1982-2010
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Real-Time Data for Variables of Interest
Greenbook, 1978-2010
Real-time (2 lags) Real-time (1 lag) Current Vintage
GDP
Real-time (2 lags) 1.00 0.97 0.84
Real-time (1 lag) -­‐-­‐ 1.00 0.82
Current Vintage -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐ 1.00
G
Real-time (2 lags) 1.00 0.96 0.62
Real-time (1 lag) -­‐-­‐ 1.00 0.58
Current Vintage -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐ 1.00
Receipts
Real-time (2 lags) 1.00 0.94 0.81
Real-time (1 lag) -­‐-­‐ 1.00 0.74
Current Vintage -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐ 1.00
Private GDP
Real-time (2 lags) 1.00 0.97 0.81
Real-time (1 lag) -­‐-­‐ 1.00 0.79
Current Vintage -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐ 1.00
Defense Spending
Real-time (2 lags) 1.00 0.94 0.88
Real-time (1 lag) -­‐-­‐ 1.00 0.87
Current Vintage -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐ 1.00
Consumer Price Inflation
Real-time (2 lags) 1.00 1.00 0.99
Real-time (1 lag) -­‐-­‐ 1.00 0.98
Current Vintage -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐ 1.00
GDP Deflator
Real-time (2 lags) 1.00 0.98 0.93
Real-time (1 lag) -­‐-­‐ 1.00 0.91
Current Vintage -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐ 1.00
Note: Calculations are coefficients of correlation between series. Defense 
spending series begins in 1981q3.  Consumer inflation series begins in 
1979q3.
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Table 2.2: VAR Specifications
VAR 
Specification
Current Vintage 
or Real-Time 
Data
Rolling 
Estimation or 
Static
Use Current-
Period or 
Forecast Data
VAR1 Current Static Curent Period
VAR2 Current Rolling Forecast
VAR3 Real-Time Static Current Period
VAR4 Real-Time Rolling Forecast
Notes: current-period data refers to data corresponding to the period in 
which the forecast is being made (for future periods).  The use of 
forecast data, then, refers to specifications where the VAR does not have 
access to current-period data (which would not be available to a 
forecaster) when estimating future period outcomes.
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Table 2.3: Forecast Error Statistics
by Forecaster, 1983-2010 and 1990-2010
G T G T
feYt+1 feYt+2 feYt+3 feYt+4 feYt+5 feYt+6 feYt+7 feYt+8 feGt+1 feTt+1 feYt+1 feYt+2 feYt+3 feYt+4 feYt+5 feYt+6 feYt+7 feYt+8 feGt+1 feTt+1
Mean Error (percentage points)
GB 0.13 -­‐0.04 -­‐0.12 -­‐0.17 -­‐0.31 -­‐0.40 -­‐0.29 -­‐0.31 0.59 0.46 0.07 -­‐0.12 -­‐0.19 -­‐0.24 -­‐0.25 -­‐0.33 -­‐0.18 -­‐0.25 0.08 -­‐0.09
RSQE 0.29 -­‐0.04 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.09 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.16 -­‐0.22 -­‐0.38 0.95 0.06 0.06 -­‐0.15 -­‐0.23 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.15 -­‐0.29 -­‐0.41 0.55 0.17
Average* 0.16 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.16 -­‐0.19 -­‐0.21 -­‐0.15 -­‐0.20 -­‐0.26 0.76 0.20 0.19 0.00 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.14 -­‐0.13 -­‐0.14 -­‐0.36 0.25 0.07
VAR1 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.19 -­‐0.24 -­‐0.25 -­‐0.27 -­‐0.28 -­‐0.30 -­‐0.30 -­‐0.04 -­‐0.75 -­‐0.42 -­‐0.41 -­‐0.39 -­‐0.28 -­‐0.23 -­‐0.27 -­‐0.32 -­‐0.34 -­‐0.33 -­‐1.62
VAR2 -­‐0.42 -­‐0.60 -­‐0.75 -­‐0.80 -­‐0.86 -­‐0.91 -­‐0.95 -­‐0.97 -­‐0.19 -­‐0.87 -­‐0.74 -­‐0.91 -­‐1.04 -­‐0.96 -­‐0.94 -­‐0.95 -­‐0.98 -­‐0.98 -­‐0.46 -­‐1.56
VAR3 -­‐0.07 -­‐0.16 -­‐0.22 -­‐0.17 -­‐0.18 -­‐0.21 -­‐0.19 -­‐0.22 -­‐0.19 -­‐1.41 -­‐0.28 -­‐0.31 -­‐0.33 -­‐0.21 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.02 0.00 0.00 -­‐0.36 -­‐2.35
VAR4 0.01 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.09 -­‐0.14 -­‐0.17 -­‐0.12 -­‐0.13 0.02 -­‐1.14 -­‐0.15 -­‐0.15 -­‐0.13 -­‐0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 -­‐0.01 -­‐0.21 -­‐2.06
Mean Squared Error (percentage points)
GB 2.19 2.30 2.37 2.38 2.33 2.22 2.43 2.90 4.19 10.43 2.17 2.40 2.53 2.55 2.46 2.33 2.53 2.93 3.06 10.52
RSQE 2.41 2.54 2.65 2.66 2.60 2.62 2.68 2.77 3.56 10.88 2.50 2.79 2.90 2.85 2.77 2.72 2.79 2.83 3.05 11.43
Average* 2.05 2.24 2.33 2.34 2.36 2.29 2.49 2.85 3.51 9.32 2.15 2.37 2.50 2.55 2.53 2.42 2.59 2.97 2.79 9.76
VAR1 2.58 2.43 2.40 2.39 2.38 2.38 2.39 2.39 3.41 13.68 2.61 2.61 2.59 2.50 2.47 2.46 2.47 2.49 3.16 13.92
VAR2 2.71 2.77 2.82 2.66 2.61 2.59 2.60 2.63 3.50 14.35 2.82 2.98 3.02 2.79 2.66 2.68 2.69 2.71 3.26 14.86
VAR3 2.81 2.69 2.72 2.45 2.29 2.25 2.25 2.25 5.31 16.34 2.74 2.78 2.80 2.53 2.34 2.33 2.33 2.32 3.70 16.05
VAR4 2.58 2.44 2.42 2.42 2.36 2.34 2.30 2.30 4.98 15.05 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.50 2.44 2.43 2.43 2.43 3.55 14.66
Mean Absolute Error (percentage points)
GB 1.73 1.78 1.83 1.78 1.76 1.67 1.84 2.22 3.03 6.85 1.74 1.89 2.00 1.93 1.89 1.77 1.91 2.23 2.36 6.78
RSQE 1.91 1.87 1.93 1.97 1.84 1.86 1.95 2.02 2.77 7.94 2.00 2.08 2.11 2.09 1.96 1.92 2.02 2.03 2.44 8.37
Average* 1.64 1.69 1.75 1.73 1.71 1.67 1.80 2.01 2.64 6.66 1.72 1.80 1.88 1.89 1.85 1.78 1.85 2.06 2.15 7.04
VAR1 1.89 1.81 1.78 1.77 1.76 1.76 1.77 1.77 2.69 9.90 1.94 1.93 1.91 1.85 1.82 1.80 1.82 1.84 2.45 9.95
VAR2 1.99 2.00 2.03 1.86 1.83 1.81 1.83 1.86 2.75 10.59 2.12 2.14 2.16 1.96 1.87 1.89 1.90 1.91 2.54 10.89
VAR3 2.11 2.01 2.09 1.83 1.67 1.65 1.66 1.65 3.77 11.99 2.05 2.07 2.13 1.89 1.71 1.70 1.70 1.69 2.93 11.38
VAR4 1.88 1.81 1.78 1.79 1.74 1.72 1.69 1.70 3.64 11.36 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.84 1.79 1.78 1.78 1.78 2.79 10.89
Notes: Average forecast error is the unweighted arithmetic mean of Greenbook and RSQE forecast errors.  VAR1 is a 4 period lag on current vintage data, estimated 
over entire sample period.  VAR2 is a 4 period lag on current vintage data, estimated on a rolling basis without access to the current period's data.  VAR3 is a 4 period 
lag on real-time data, estimated over the entire sample period.  VAR4 is a 4 period lag on real-time data, estimated on a rolling basis without access to the current 
period's real-time data.
GDP GDP
1983 - 2010 1990-2010
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Table 2.4: Cumulative Forecast Error Statistics
by Forecaster, 1983-2010 and 1990-2010
G T G T
feYt+1 feYt+2 feYt+3 feYt+4 feYt+5 feYt+6 feYt+7 feYt+8 feGt+1 feTt+1 feYt+1 feYt+2 feYt+3 feYt+4 feYt+5 feYt+6 feYt+7 feYt+8 feGt+1 feTt+1
Mean Error (percentage points)
GB 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.03 -­‐0.02 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.46 0.17 -­‐0.51 0.00 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.13 -­‐0.21 -­‐0.29 -­‐0.34 -­‐0.31 -­‐0.40 0.00 -­‐0.53
RSQE 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.00 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.07 -­‐0.19 -­‐0.31 0.23 -­‐0.08 0.01 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.09 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.12 -­‐0.16 -­‐0.26 -­‐0.35 0.13 -­‐0.06
Average* 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.01 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.18 -­‐0.44 0.19 -­‐0.30 0.03 0.02 -­‐0.02 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.13 -­‐0.15 -­‐0.36 0.06 -­‐0.27
VAR1 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.09 -­‐0.15 -­‐0.22 -­‐0.29 -­‐0.37 -­‐0.45 -­‐0.53 -­‐0.02 -­‐0.38 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.22 -­‐0.32 -­‐0.40 -­‐0.46 -­‐0.53 -­‐0.62 -­‐0.71 -­‐0.09 -­‐0.61
VAR2 -­‐0.11 -­‐0.27 -­‐0.46 -­‐0.66 -­‐0.87 -­‐1.10 -­‐1.34 -­‐1.58 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.43 -­‐0.19 -­‐0.43 -­‐0.69 -­‐0.93 -­‐1.17 -­‐1.40 -­‐1.65 -­‐1.89 -­‐0.13 -­‐0.63
VAR3 0.00 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.09 -­‐0.13 -­‐0.18 -­‐0.21 -­‐0.25 -­‐0.02 -­‐0.51 -­‐0.04 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.12 -­‐0.14 -­‐0.15 -­‐0.15 -­‐0.16 -­‐0.17 -­‐0.06 -­‐0.74
VAR4 -­‐0.03 -­‐0.07 -­‐0.13 -­‐0.17 -­‐0.22 -­‐0.27 -­‐0.32 -­‐0.38 -­‐0.07 -­‐0.63 -­‐0.08 -­‐0.16 -­‐0.25 -­‐0.30 -­‐0.32 -­‐0.33 -­‐0.33 -­‐0.33 -­‐0.10 -­‐0.87
Mean Squared Error (percentage points)
GB 0.57 1.01 1.46 1.86 2.28 2.63 2.99 3.52 0.88 2.83 0.58 1.04 1.50 1.94 2.37 2.75 3.11 3.57 0.75 2.89
RSQE 0.59 1.03 1.49 1.90 2.27 2.62 3.07 3.59 0.88 2.79 0.62 1.12 1.63 2.09 2.51 2.90 3.34 3.79 0.76 2.97
Average* 0.56 0.99 1.43 1.82 2.25 2.59 2.92 3.47 0.82 2.49 0.59 1.04 1.51 1.97 2.41 2.79 3.14 3.62 0.71 2.63
VAR1 0.65 1.01 1.29 1.48 1.63 1.74 1.87 2.00 0.86 3.63 0.66 1.05 1.35 1.54 1.68 1.81 1.94 2.07 0.79 3.79
VAR2 0.68 1.18 1.68 2.10 2.47 2.79 3.09 3.40 0.88 3.84 0.71 1.25 1.78 2.22 2.59 2.92 3.23 3.53 0.82 4.08
VAR3 0.65 1.01 1.21 1.41 1.54 1.61 1.71 1.78 1.24 3.94 0.64 1.04 1.26 1.43 1.54 1.63 1.71 1.79 0.89 3.95
VAR4 0.70 1.21 1.64 2.01 2.29 2.50 2.69 2.84 1.33 4.37 0.69 1.23 1.70 2.06 2.31 2.52 2.68 2.83 0.93 4.44
Mean Absolute Error (percentage points)
GB 0.45 0.79 1.16 1.49 1.86 2.16 2.48 2.81 0.69 1.71 0.46 0.82 1.21 1.56 1.93 2.26 2.60 2.86 0.59 1.68
RSQE 0.47 0.80 1.15 1.44 1.72 1.96 2.35 2.81 0.68 1.98 0.49 0.88 1.29 1.62 1.96 2.23 2.60 2.99 0.60 2.12
Average* 0.44 0.76 1.11 1.41 1.78 2.05 2.34 2.75 0.63 1.67 0.47 0.81 1.19 1.54 1.91 2.23 2.57 2.91 0.56 1.74
VAR1 0.47 0.71 0.93 1.06 1.17 1.24 1.34 1.45 0.67 2.53 0.49 0.75 0.98 1.12 1.24 1.31 1.41 1.49 0.61 2.59
VAR2 0.50 0.83 1.21 1.53 1.79 2.00 2.23 2.48 0.69 2.73 0.54 0.90 1.29 1.64 1.90 2.14 2.36 2.63 0.64 2.84
VAR3 0.47 0.72 0.90 1.01 1.08 1.15 1.28 1.35 0.91 2.91 0.47 0.74 0.93 1.03 1.08 1.15 1.26 1.33 0.70 2.83
VAR4 0.53 0.90 1.25 1.50 1.72 1.89 2.05 2.23 0.94 3.10 0.51 0.91 1.27 1.52 1.72 1.87 2.00 2.17 0.73 3.00
Notes: Average forecast error is the unweighted arithmetic mean of Greenbook and RSQE forecast errors.  
1983 - 2010 1990-2010
GDP GDP
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Table 2.5: Fiscal Multiplier of G on GDP
Greenbook Data, 1978-2010
Number of Quarters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Project onto G shock
GDP 0.924 0.856 0.998 1.158 1.281 1.445 1.673 1.896
Private GDP -0.119 -0.198 -0.057 0.105 0.227 0.389 0.618 0.847
Project onto (T, G, Y)' shock
GDP 0.924 0.856 0.998 1.158 1.332 1.539 1.739 1.949
Private GDP -0.119 -0.198 -0.057 0.105 0.277 0.482 0.683 0.899
sample size 132 132 132 132 120 89 57 25
Note: Estimates are obtained using net present value calculation procedure described in Mountford 
and Uhlig (2009) using r=.04.  Cyclically-adjusted real federal gross receipts are ordered first.
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Table 2.6: Fiscal Multiplier of G on GDP
RSQE Data, 1983-2010
Number of Quarters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Project onto G shock
GDP 0.503 0.352 0.367 0.304 0.317 0.363 0.456 0.550 0.888 1.278 1.679 1.797
Private GDP -­‐0.504 -­‐0.653 -­‐0.627 -­‐0.682 -­‐0.664 -­‐0.614 -­‐0.517 -­‐0.415 -­‐0.132 0.251 0.648 0.681
Project onto (T, G, Y)' shock
GDP 0.468 0.261 0.211 0.107 0.082 0.093 0.165 0.183 0.342 0.594 0.928 1.110
Private GDP -0.537 -0.740 -0.778 -0.872 -0.892 -0.876 -0.800 -0.773 -0.729 -0.530 -0.221 -0.143
sample size 131 130 129 128 127 126 114 102 87 76 57 38
Note: Estimates are obtained using net present value calculation procedure described in Mountford and Uhlig (2009) using 
r=.04.  Cyclically-adjusted real government net receipts are ordered first.
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Table 2.7: Fiscal Multiplier of G on GDP, Instrument G with Defense Spending
Greenbook Data 1982-2010
Number of Quarters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Project onto G shock
GDP 0.727 0.668 0.748 0.714 0.786 0.866 1.206 1.317
Private GDP -0.293 -0.360 -0.287 -0.328 -0.261 -0.185 0.150 0.257
Project onto (T, G, Y)' shock
GDP 0.752 0.708 0.798 0.763 0.831 0.910 1.144 1.238
Private GDP -0.269 -0.323 -0.239 -0.281 -0.218 -0.142 0.088 0.178
sample size 117 117 117 117 109 83 54 25
Note: Estimates are obtained using net present value calculation procedure described in Mountford 
and Uhlig (2009) using r=.04.  Cyclically-adjusted real federal gross receipts are ordered first.
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Appendix
2.7 Tax Elasticity of Output
The within-period elasticity of taxes with respect to output ητ,y is estimated in a similar manner
to Blanchard and Perotti (2002). ητ,y is an average of various tax elasticities weighted by their
respected shares of total taxes, στi,τ , as follows:
ητ,y =
∑
i
ητi,BiηBi,Y στi,τ . (2.13)
In equation 2.13 above, the elasticity of each tax is broken into two separate components: 1) the
elasticity of tax i to its tax base Bi, and 2) the elasticity of the tax base to output. With respect
to relatively proportional taxes, such as payroll taxes, ητi,Bi is closer to unity, while for progressive
taxes, such as the federal income tax, ητi,Bi is a larger number.
In constructing these various elasticities, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) rely on estimates provided
by Giorno et al (1995) and supply their own estimates based on a series of regressions of log changes
of the tax base on leads and lags of log changes to output. The contemporaneous effect is treated
as the within-period elasticity. We create a similar series of estimates below for each measure of
taxation used in our analysis.
2.7.1 Greenbook
Using BEA data of personal income, output, and various tax receipts, supplemented by CPS
measures of employment and average weekly earnings among the employed, we directly estimate
elasticity measures for three federal taxes that make up more than 90 percent of gross federal
receipts: the personal income tax (TPF), the corporate income tax (TCF), and social insurance
taxes (TSIF).
2.7.1.1 Social Insurance Taxes
The relationship between social insurance taxes and output is characterized by Giorno et al
(1995) as T = t(w)w(E)E(Y ), where t(w) is the tax rate on wages, w(E) is earnings, and E(Y ) is
the employment level. With a little bit of rearrangement, the elasticity of federal social insurance
taxes ηTSIF,y can then be separated into three parts: 1) the elasticity of employment with respect
to output ηE,y, 2) the elasticity of weekly average wages among the employed with respect to
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employment ηw,E , and 3) the elasticity of social insurance taxes with respect to wages ηwt,w.
ηTSIF,y = ηE,y
[
ηw,Eηwt,w + 1
]
(2.14)
We use the quarterly average of seasonally-adjusted privately employed production and nonsupervi-
sory employees as our measure of E. For wages w, we use the average weekly earnings of privately
employed production and nonsupervisory employees. Regressing the log change of each variable on
one lead and four lags of the log change in output and employment, respectively, we obtain within-
period elasticity estimates of ηE,y = .33 and ηw,E = .66 when we restrict the sample to 1978-2010
(the period for which we have GB forecasts of federal receipts). These estimates are close to those
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who find ηE,y = .42 and ηw,E = .62. When we change our sample
to 1964-1997, the last year included in Blanchard and Perotti’s analysis, our estimates are .36 and
.68, respectively. Using different measures of earnings and wages slightly alters our results, but the
product of the two elasticities is surprisingly robust to our choice of wage and employment pairing.
The elasticity of taxes with respect to earnings, ηwt,w, is taken to be 1.0 in Giorno et al and
Blanchard and Perotti. We adopt instead the convention that the elasticity is equal to the share of
covered earnings, which changes slowly over time. Thus, we use ηwt,w = 0.85. Combining the three
measures, we get ηTSIF,y slightly greater than 0.5.
2.7.1.2 Federal Personal Income Taxes
The elasticity of the federal personal income tax ηTPF,y is calculated in a departure from Blan-
chard and Perotti. They utilize the elasticities calculated above and combine them with an estimate
of ηwt,w from Giorno et al, who find that in the United States the gross-earnings elasticity of income
tax rises from 2.5 in 1978 to 3.9 in 1992. As this is an annual number, and the earnings base for
the federal income tax is substantially different from earned income, we instead repeat the analysis
above, but with personal income directly. We define TPF (B(Y )) to be the federal income tax TPF
as a function of the income base B, which is a function of output Y . The elasticity ηTPF,y, then, is
ηTPF,y = ηTPF,BηB,y. (2.15)
We estimate ηTPF,B using the same lead and lag formulation as for social insurance taxes, where B
is aggregate personal income, and obtain an estimate of 2.34. The elasticity ηB,y is 0.48, yielding
ηTPF,y = 1.12.
90
2.7.1.3 Federal Corporate Income Taxes
Our corporate tax analysis is performed identically to the personal income tax. Given
ηTCF,y = ηTCF,BηB,y, . (2.16)
we estimate ηTCF,B = 1.0 and ηB,y = 3.69, yielding ηTCF,y = 3.7.
2.7.1.4 Other Federal Taxes and Aggregate Elasticity
Our measure of gross federal receipts in Federal Reserve Greenbook forecasts includes other
federal taxes that are not included above, but which constitute on average almost 10 percent of
revenues. We assume a within-period elasticity of 1.0 for these other taxes with respect to output.
The weighted average within-period elasticity of federal taxes with respect to GDP, ητ,y, is
estimated to be about 1.18.
2.7.2 RSQE
The primary differences between our measure of receipts in RSQE forecasts and our Greenbook
measure are 1) the presence of state and local revenues in RSQE forecasts, and 2) RSQE receipts
are net receipts, so they include transfers such as social security payments. We define net receipts
as follows:
NRt =GFRt +GSLRt −GTRFt −GTRSLt, (2.17)
where GFRt = gross federal receipts (personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, indirect busi-
ness taxes, social insurance taxes, household transfers to the federal government, and business trans-
fers to the federal government);7 GSLRt = gross state receipts (personal income taxes, corporate
income taxes, indirect business taxes, social insurance taxes, and federal aid to states); GTRFt =
federal transfers (government transfers to persons and federal aid to states); and GTRSLt = state
and local transfers.
In addition, our RSQE forecasts range from 1983-2015 rather than 1978-2015, so some minor
differences arise from this change of sample. The three federal taxes above, as well as state and local
personal income taxes (TPSL), are calculated in the same manner as for the Greenbooks, and they
7Before 2004, RSQE did not itemize forecasts of household and business transfers to the federal government.
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yield the following estimated within-period elasticities as follows:
ηTPF,y =0.45
ηTSIF,y =0.40
ηTCF,y =3.63
ηTPSL,y =0.21
2.7.2.1 Indirect State and Local Business Taxes
Indirect business taxes mostly consist of sales taxes collected from retailers, but paid to businesses
by consumers as a proportional tax on some subset of final goods. Blanchard and Perotti use an
elasticity of 1.0 for this category, while noting that some goods are exempt from sales taxes. We
estimate the elasticity using the BEA measure of indirect business taxes collected by state and local
governments (TIBSL), and find ηTIBSL,y = .61.
2.7.2.2 Transfers and Aggregate Elasticity
Transfers enter into the average elasticity equation as a negative share, and their respective
within-period elasticities span a large range. Social security benefits, which are a large portion
of transfers, likely have little-to-no relationship with contemporaneous changes to output, while
unemployment benefits react quite strongly (and inversely) to GDP. We use -0.2 as our elasticity
of total transfers to GDP, following Blanchard and Perotti in using OECD estimates. Given net
receipts (NR) is equal to gross receipts (GR) less transfers (TR),
ητ,y = ηNR,y = ηGR,yσGR,NR − ηTR,yσTR,NR, (2.18)
where σGR,NR is the share of gross receipts to net receipts and σTR,NR is the share of transfers to
net receipts.
The weighted average within-period elasticity of government net receipts with respect to GDP,
ητ,y, is estimated to be about 1.75.
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2.7.3 The Tax Elasticity Restriction
From section 2.2, the system of equations 2.7-2.9 combined with identifying restrictions α11 = 0
and α22 = 0 yields the following:
uτt =α12ε
y
t + ε
τ
t (2.19)
ugt =α21ε
τ
t + ε
g
t (2.20)
uyt =α31ε
τ
t + α32ε
g
t + ε
y
t (2.21)
The additional restriction ητ,y = η allows us to estimate this system of equations uniquely. If forecast
errors ut are transformed to represent growth rate errors, then ητ,y =
duτt
duyt
=
duτt
dεyt
= α12 = η.
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CHAPTER III
Tax Salience and Charitable Giving
3.1 Introduction
Economists have often assumed in their models what they decry in their public statements, which
is that consumers internalize the full costs of transactions, inclusive of taxes. Effective tax incidence
is fully segregated from statutory tax incidence in standard economic theory, but we know better
and have often said so. Milton Friedman argued against the income tax withholding system (in
peace time) on primarily salience grounds.1 John Stuart Mill (1848) also hypothesized that hidden
tax systems lead to bigger government. Gregory Mankiw has on several occasions mentioned this
possibility as a potential argument against the VAT, which he otherwise lauds as efficient.2 Each of
these notable economists has treated salience as an important component in ensuring that consumers
completely account for the effect that taxes and tax rates will have on their choice sets.
Chetty et al. (2009) determine that sales taxes assessed at the checkout counter lead to quali-
tatively different consumer behavior than equivalent taxes embedded in the sticker price of a wide
range of goods. The higher relative salience of embedded taxes leads to a stronger disincentive
to consume goods than the less salient regime of adding taxes to the sticker price at the point of
purchase, even when the consumer knows the sales tax rate. In a companion paper, Chetty et al.
(2007) develop a model of bounded rationality to explain the importance of tax salience on consumer
behavior, arguing that the first-order cognitive cost of determining the full price of a good is weighed
against the second-order effect of re-optimizing consumption allocation in response to a small tax.
Finkelstein (2009) also finds evidence that the salience of a price regime, in this case highway
tolls, distorts the consumer response to pricing changes. She determines that after the adoption of
E-ZPass and similar electronic toll collection methods, the demand for toll roads became significantly
1Interview with Reason Magazine available at http://reason.com/archives/1995/06/01/best-of-both-worlds.
2See http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2009/10/value-added-tax.html for one example.
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less price elastic.
This paper examines a component of the U.S. tax system long known for its opacity: the federal
income tax code. In particular, I look at one particularly complicated part of the federal income
tax: a shadow tax with its own rules that often controvert well-understood heuristics regarding
deductibility and progressive tax brackets, known as the Alternative Minimum Tax.
The AMT was originally created as a back-up tax regime in response to a national outcry over
several hundred high-net-worth individuals who, due to their judicious use of deductions, owed no
federal income tax. Because 1) the AMT was not indexed to inflation until 2013, 2) AMT preferences
such as state and local taxes have grown in scope relative to other deductions in the tax code, and
3) regular tax bracket rates have fallen significantly in the past 40 years, this tax now affects four
million filers a year.
There are several reasons to believe that the AMT has lower salience than the rest of the federal
income tax code. It primarily affects the tax return of the prior year as opposed to being withheld
during the year in which income is earned and charitable donations are bestowed. Second, it is
a relatively uncommon provision of the tax code in the sense that few taxpayers carry an AMT
liability. Third, the AMT operates in the background of the primary tax bracket, rate, and deduction
structure. Fourth, the universe of AMT preferences is quite complex (Burman et al. (2003) gives a
comprehensive treatment of this issue). Even though the existence of the AMT is well-known and
AMT liability is readily calculable, these timing and salience issues may have a substantial effect on
consumer behavior.
The AMT has distinct tax brackets and marginal rates relative to the regular federal income
tax. Typically taxpayers who end up with an AMT liability find themselves with a higher total
tax bill but lower marginal rate than if they were governed solely by the primary tax regime. This
variation in income and marginal rates presents an opportunity to test whether AMT status is
fully anticipated or fully incorporated into the decision-making of the taxpayer through the vehicle
of charitable giving, a consumption good that has a strong and well-established relationship with
marginal tax rates and after-tax income.
Beginning with Taussig (1967), hundreds of papers been devoted to characterizing the influence
that the tax code has on the level of charitable contributions. The richness of this body of research
demonstrates that the relationship between marginal tax rates, after-tax income, and charitable
giving can be readily estimated, which is helpful in any endeavor to test the salience of a particular
aspect of the tax code.
The early cross-sectional studies of tax filer data showed that charitable contributions are both
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normal goods and relatively price elastic, spanning a rather narrow band of elasticities (Clotfel-
ter 1985). Subsequent work, focused on eliminating omitted variable bias and endogeneity issues
stemming from the timing of charitable contributions, has utilized panel data of both the tax file
and survey varieties. The balance of this body of work is well-characterized by the meta-analysis
of Peloza and Steel (2005) and literature survey by List (2011), which conclude that the (absolute
value of the) permanent price elasticity of demand for charitable giving is somewhat greater than 1.
The rest of the paper goes as follows: in section 3.2 I describe the interaction between the AMT
and charitable giving. In section 3.3 I discuss the data I will use in the paper. In section 3.4 I lay
out the model(s) for charitable giving and modify them to test the salience of the AMT. In section
3.5 I discuss estimation results. In section 3.6 I conclude.
3.2 The Alternative Minimum Tax and Charitable Giving
3.2.1 AMT Structure
The federal Alternative Minimum Tax has its origins in 1969 when Congress first passed a
backstop minimum tax to address public concerns that high-income filers were paying little or no
tax as a result of their use of deductions to reduce taxable income.3 At the time, no tax brackets
were indexed for inflation, but the 1981 tax cut indexed most the regular income tax while omitting
the AMT brackets and exemptions. Inflation was the largest culprit in making the AMT a relevant
tax for a significant minority of taxpayers by the 2000s, at which point the president and Congress
began issuing a series of one-time “fixes” that raised the exemption for a year or two to prevent
millions more AMT taxpayers. In the course of resolving the “fiscal cliff” at the end of 2012, the
AMT exemptions and tax brackets were permanently indexed at higher levels to prevent further
bracket creep.
The federal AMT consists of a set of supplemental calculations that are conducted to determine
an alternative measure of federal income taxes owed. This measure is then compared with the
traditional personal income tax apparatus, and the filer owes the greater of the two. The term
“minimum” in the AMT refers, then, to the fact that a taxpayer owes at least as much as their
AMT liability.
The AMT takes gross income and subtracts qualifying deductions and exemptions, then applies
its rate structure to determine AMT liability. Some nonrefundable and refundable credits are then
3See Burman et al (2003) for much more detail. Ironically, the taxpayers who escaped income taxes completely
were mostly widows and retirees deriving their income from tax-exempt municipal bonds, which is still allowed under
current AMT rules as long as the bonds are not “private activity bonds.”
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netted against this liability to determine a filer’s final liability, just as in the federal income tax.
The biggest differences between the regular tax and the AMT are that 1) the AMT is much less
generous in the type of deductions that it allows to be counted against gross income, and 2) the rate
structure of the AMT is much flatter, with a higher exemption. As a result, the type of filer who
is most likely to owe an AMT liability is one with a high-enough income to exhaust the relatively
large exemption and a significant number of deductions that qualify under the rules of the regular
income tax but not the AMT.
The types of deductions that cannot be taken against the AMT are called AMT preferences
and adjustments, and they include state and local income taxes, personal exemptions, the standard
deduction, property taxes, and most miscellaneous itemized deductions, as well as a host of less
common deductions. In addition, unexercised stock options must be recognized for AMT purposes
in the year in which they are earned, valued at the difference between their market price and option
price. The deductions which can be counted against the AMT include medical expenses (in excess of
AGI), charitable contributions, and mortgage interest (so long as the mortgage was used to purchase
or improve your home).
The AMT exemption, which substitutes for a standard deduction and personal exemptions,
was $53,600 in 2015 for single taxpayers and $83,400 for married taxpayers filing jointly. The two
statutory rates are 26 percent and 28 percent, with the higher rate applicable for taxable income
(for AMT purposes) above $185,400 for both single and married filers. In addition, beginning at
$119,200 ($158,900 for married filing jointly) in taxable income the AMT exemption begins to phase
out at a rate of $1 for each $4 in additional income. The true marginal (federal) rate, then, of an
AMT filer progresses from 26 percent to 26 ∗ 1.25 = 32.5 percent, reaching a high of 28 ∗ 1.25 = 35
percent before the exemption is exhausted, at which point the rate returns to 28 percent.
3.2.2 Interaction with Charitable Giving
As a non-AMT preference item, charitable donations can be deducted against a filer’s AMT
taxable income, just like the regular federal income tax. Therefore, the after-tax price of giving,
Pit, is either 1− τ regularit or 1− τAMTit depending on whether the filer has an AMT liability, where
τ regularit is the marginal tax rate for a filer under the traditional income tax structure for filer i at
time t and τAMTit is the corresponding marginal tax rate under the AMT regime.
For filers who are at risk of incurring an AMT liability, their statutory federal marginal tax rate
can vary widely; if they have many personal exemptions or live in a high-tax state, they might be
in the 15 percent bracket and still end up owing the AMT. More commonly, filers are in the upper
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middle class, as the relatively large exemption zeros out any AMT tax liability at modest income
levels, and the more progressive tax rates under the regular rate structure create a higher tax liability
for very-high income filers than the flat rate structure of the AMT.
As a result, an AMT filer might have a smaller, equal, or larger marginal tax rate than they
would under the regular income tax, and therefore a larger, equal, or smaller tax price of charitable
donations. In practice, AMT filers are about twice as likely to have lower marginal tax rates than
higher ones (see Burman et al (2003)), so the AMT tends to raise the price of charitable giving.
3.3 Creating Panel Tax Data
My analysis uses longitudinal data from the Panel Survey on Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID
contains data on wages and salary, self-employment income, business income, transfers, and passive
income such as rent, pensions, and dividends, as well as rich demographic information about each
family unit. I combine the 1999-2013 biannual surveys to construct a panel dataset for respondents
that spans the tax years 1998 to 2012. For each year I construct key income variables following Kim
et al. (2014) and input these variables into the TAXSIM program maintained by Daniel Feenberg.4
Since these are survey data rather than tax data, the inputs into TAXSIM are less precise than
the actual tax data available via the Statistics of Income (SOI) or other confidential panel data
from the Department of the Treasury. This source of measurement error may cause some amount of
attenuation bias, investigated more fully below. As Peloza and Steel (2005) note, however, estimates
of the price elasticity of demand for charitable giving are nevertheless frequently higher for survey
data. Biased reporting of contribution levels, such as in Slemrod (1989), may inflate elasticities if
misreporting increases with income levels (and also tax rates).
The key benefit of using the PSID is that it is a publicly available panel dataset with demographic,
income, and charitable giving information for those family units who itemize their federal income
taxes. In addition, the income data in the PSID is quite detailed and may represent total income
more accurately than income reported on a tax form. The key downside is that the sample size of
the PSID is moderate (about 8,000 family units responded to each survey between 1999 and 2013)
and the sample is skewed towards moderate-income families who are neither as likely to itemize their
deductions nor to find themselves with an AMT liability in a given year. Nevertheless, the sheer
magnitude of the increase in the number of AMT filers over the past 15 years has meant that both
4The TAXSIM program is able to identify only a narrow definition of an AMT taxpayer, specifically one who owes
an AMT liability after the regular federal income tax and credits have been applied. A broader definition of AMT
taxpayer, such as any taxpayer whose net liabilities increase as a result of the AMT (due to the limitation that the
AMT puts on credits like the general business credit), outstrips the capabilities of TAXSIM.
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moderate-income and upper-middle-class families have found themselves facing an AMT liability
with greater frequency than in the past. About 2 percent of family units in 2012 owed tax as a
result of the AMT in the PSID, which over-samples poorer families, who are unlikely to have an
AMT liability.
In addition to income, tax, and demographic detail, I also constructed wealth variables for each
tax unit. The presence of wealth in any charitable giving regression can help eliminate confusion of
temporary with permanent price and income elasticities, and it is especially important when using
survey data that are lacking important information on realized capital gains, which correlate with
contributions. Since changes in wealth are the primary drivers of this correlation, inclusion of wealth
data is a necessary step in preventing bias in the estimates.
The summary statistics of the tax-augmented PSID dataset are presented in table 3.1. Roughly
31% of tax units make itemizable charitable contributions, and those who itemize and make char-
itable contributions have significantly higher median income, average wealth, and median wealth.
The average charitable contribution among itemizers with a non-zero contribution is $3,441, with
significant variance between and within income groupings (see figure 3.1). The sample skews slightly
older and is much more likely to be married than the sample as a whole. AMT filers, at 1.1 percent,
represent a small fraction of the total sample, and they are quite wealthy relative to the PSID sam-
ple. A key point arises from the summary statistics in table 1, which is that one challenge of any
estimation technique that distinguishes AMT filers from their fellow taxpayers is to allow sufficient
flexibility of income and wealth effects on charitable contributions so that AMT filers are compared
with similarly situated families rather than imposing a constricting functional form that implicitly
contrasts behavior of high income families with those whose incomes are much more modest.
Table 3.2 records key summary statistics on itemizing deductions, charitable donations, and
AMT liability by income group in the sample. The share of itemizers, donors, and AMT filers all
rise (unsurprisingly) with income. In addition, the number of AMT filers is overrepresented in the
sample as a share of high-income taxpayers, while it is underrepresented in the middle-income range.
One potential cause of this underrepresentation is the limited information provided on itemized
deductions; another is the simplification of the tax code when in TAXSIM, which ignores some
credits that might be disqualified by the AMT.
The number of AMT taxpayers, shown as a whole in table 3.1 and by income group in table
3.2, is quite small in my sample. Only 733 records have a positive AMT liability. Of these records,
over 2/3 itemize and made a charitable donation in the year in which they incurred this liability,
averaging $4,291 in contributions. Although this number is higher than the average for itemizers with
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a contribution, table 3.2 shows that the comparison is misleading; within each income class, mean
charitable donations are lower for AMT taxpayers than for their non-AMT counterparts, whether
the sample is restricted to donors or not.
Lower giving rates and levels could mean 1) that higher tax bills and higher tax prices on
donations are at least somewhat salient to AMT filers; 2) that AMT filers are situated at or near
the bottom of each income category; 3) that AMT filers are disproportionately likely to be earning
high temporary income (which presumably is less likely to be spent on charity and more likely to be
saved relative to permanent income); 4) that AMT filers have other attributes that correlate with
lower giving; or 5) that the small sample size is leading to over-interpretation of sample means. I
investigate these hypotheses in more detail below.
3.4 Model
3.4.1 Cross-Sectional Charitable-Giving Models
The canonical model of charitable contributions, first specified by Taussig (1967),5 is given by:
ln git = α1 lnY
d
it + α2 lnPit +Xitβ + εit, (3.1)
where git is the level of giving that appears on an itemized deduction, Y
d
it is discretionary (or after-
tax) income, and Pit is the price of charitable contributions, which depends on the marginal federal
and state income tax rates as well as the extent to which contributions are deductible on both the
federal and state returns. The additional controls Xit are traditionally the kinds of demographic
information that can be found on a tax return, such as indicators for married or single, the number of
dependent exemptions taken, and an indicator for whether a tax unit has one or more members over
the age of 65. With the additional demographic information available from survey data, controls
can be richer, including age, number of children, educational attainment, race, and wealth. The
coefficient α1 in this specification represents the income elasticity of charitable giving, while α2
represents the tax price elasticity of demand.
Taussig (1967) used the marginal tax rate, net of contributions, as his regressor in determining
the price effect on giving. This rate constituted, in his mind, the true price at the margin for
incremental decision-making. Feldstein and Taylor (1976), in contrast, used the first-dollar marginal
5As is mentioned below, Taussig used the marginal tax rate as opposed to the price of charitable donations, which
leads to a slightly different interpretation of the “price” coefficient.
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rate (or the marginal rate ex contributions) to avoid the bias that stems from higher contributions
driving down the net-of-contribution marginal rate. This could induce a positive correlation between
the after-tax price and the amount of giving, in contrast to the assumed negative relation between
price and quantity demanded. A solution to this dilemma, now widely adopted in the literature, is
to use the net-of-contribution price for charitable giving, instrumented by the first-dollar price.
An additional problem with the canonical model of contributions is that it does not measure
“true” income (in the Haig-Simons sense); if the types of income that are unreported on tax forms
influence giving, which seems quite likely, then their omission from the model can potentially bias
the other results. Wealth data are a valuable correction for this potential problem, and in the PSID
I am able to create a measure of net wealth (assets minus debts, including home mortgage) for each
tax unit.
A final concern with the estimation of equation 3.1 is the enforcement of uniform price and
income elasticities across a range of personal financial situations. Taussig himself estimated the
elasticities separately for different adjusted gross income (AGI) categories, as well as Feldstein and
Taylor and many subsequent analyses.
The results of estimating the canonical model on PSID data, which will be amended later in order
to test several hypotheses regarding AMT status and giving behavior, are shown in table 3.3. In
column (a), I show the estimates from a simple least squares regression of the specification in equation
3.1. Column (b) in table 3.3 shows the effects of instrumenting the last-dollar tax rate (the tax
rate after deducting charitable donations) with the first-dollar tax rate (the tax rate if no charitable
donation had been made). Column (c) includes wealth and gift data as additional regressors. Column
(d) estimates income elasticities separately by gross income class, as well as allowing non-price
regressors (not counting wealth) to have distinct effects in each income class. Columns (c) and (d)
represent the baseline charitable giving models on which I test AMT salience. The specification in
Column (d) adds additional flexibility to the model, which is otherwise characterized by a single
elasticity across all income levels, in a manner that is consistent with the literature (see Bakija and
Heim (2011)). On the other hand, it imposes a cost in power given the small sample size of AMT
taxpayers. Even in the baseline scenario, at the 5 percent significance level I cannot reject the null
that any two of the separate estimates by class are equal to each other.
The price elasticity of demand is -0.6 and -0.68 in specifications (c) and (d), respectively, meaning
that an increase of 10 percent in the after-tax price of giving (e.g. from a 35 percent marginal tax
rate to a 28.5 percent marginal tax rate) lowers donations by 6 percent, holding after-tax income
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constant.6 This result is on the weaker end of measured price responsiveness in the literature, as
the central tendency of the price elasticity of demand is around -1 or more negative (Peloza and
Steel (20005), List (2011)). The income elasticity of demand is 0.46 in the constant income elasticity
specification, implying that a 10 percent increase in after-tax income should raise donations by 4.6
percent. Allowing the income elasticity to vary by gross income category generates similar effects
except at the lowest income class (less than $20,000), where the elasticity is 0.25. This change is
not statistically significant, however, at the 95 percent confidence level.
As a first step in determining the effect of AMT status on charitable giving, I amend the formu-
lation discussed above with an additional indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the filer is
an AMT taxpayer and 0 if the filer is not:
ln git = γD
AMT
it + α1 lnY
d
it + α2 lnPit +Xitβ + εit. (3.2)
In table 3.4 I present the results of this preliminary multivariate analysis. The effect of including
the indicator variable is minimal with respect to the other regressors, but suggests that AMT status
is correlated with lower charitable contributions. The simplest interpretation of the coefficients on
DAMTit in columns (a) and (b) is that AMT taxpayers donate 9 percent or 19 percent fewer dollars
to charity than equivalent non-AMT taxpayers; only the estimate in (b) (where income elasticity
is allowed to vary by gross income class) is statistically significant. In general, the small sample
size of AMT filers (733), of which only 2/3 have recorded donations, makes it difficult to determine
whether the apparent effect is real.
3.4.2 Estimation Challenges
To the researcher, estimation of an equation such as 3.2 is full of pitfalls. One potential source of
endogeneity is that a filer might realize capital gains in a year in which they intend to donate, which
makes the error term positively correlated with realized income Y dit . Another is that temporary
boosts to income might not reflect underlying permanent income, so Y dit and the error term could
be negatively correlated. A third arises from the fact that larger contributions git change the level
of after-tax income and potentially the marginal tax rate (in a progressive tax code). And to the
extent that omitted variables affect charitable giving and correlate with observables like income or
AMT status, their existence could also bias estimation.
6In this example, the after-tax price rises from 65 percent to 71.5 percent, a 10 percent increase, while the marginal
tax falls by a greater share.
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Measurement error is a source of endogeneity that is always a source of concern in non-tax data.
Classical measurement error tends to bias results towards zero, but in the case of measurement error
in income, the price variable can be affected as well. Even measurement error of the dependent
variable, log charitable giving, can in this case bias results; an overstated level of giving will lower
the perceived tax burden to the econometrician, creating a corresponding positive error in presumed
Y dit , but according to the dynamics of the tax code rather than the underlying income elasticity of
demand.
I am able to address several, but not all, of these potential sources of bias in the cross-sectional
framework. As mentioned above, I instrument the actual values of Y dit and Pit with their first-dollar
counterparts. This approach eliminates the endogeneity that stems from simultaneous increased
contributions altering the regressors and biasing α1 and α2. In addition, by using wealth data as a
supplemental regressor to be combined with income data, I can mitigate the bias of temporary and
realized income on estimates of the price and income elasticity of demand for charitable donations,
although the timing of realization of income to coincide with charitable contributions is not directly
addressable.
In the context of the results in table 3.4, the persistently negative effect of AMT status on
charitable contributions, even after accounting for the change in after-tax price of donating and the
change in income due to owing an AMT liability, suggests that either 1) AMT filers are overreacting
to the change in their taxes, 2) the specification above is missing systematic unobserved differences
between AMT filers that drive charitable donations, or 3) my sample size is inadequate to address
the question satisfactorily.
The first explanation, while it can not be dismissed out of hand, is at best simply question begging
and at worst completely backwards. I find that the negative effect on charitable contributions of
owing AMT liability amplifies over time, i.e. that new filers react less quickly than filers who
had faced a similar situation in the prior survey (not shown). The second explanation, that the
simple cross-sectional specification has omitted variable bias, leads naturally towards a repeat of the
foregoing investigation, this time with a fixed-effects model in order to make fuller use of the panel
dataset.
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3.4.3 Longitudinal Charitable-Giving Models
The basic log-linearized charitable demand function, estimated in a full panel setting, is repre-
sented as:
ln git = δi + α1 lnY
d
it + +α2 lnPit +Xitβ + εit. (3.3)
The interpretations of the coefficients α1, α2, and β remain the same if the model is correctly
estimated. The presence of the individual fixed effect term, δi, improves estimation of the other
coefficients if, in the cross-sectional estimation procedure in equation 3.1, omitted variables sys-
tematically correlated with one or more of the RHS variables. To the extent that those omitted
variables, such as temporarily distorted income, change over time, the estimates in equation 3.3 will
remain biased.
Although Peloza and Steel (2005) have concluded that the bias from omitted covariates and
temporary changes to income and tax liabilities in charitable giving models appears to be small, the
difference between permanent and temporary effects might be magnified for those individuals who
find themselves on the AMT.
An error-correction model for price and income effects, as shown by Bakija and Heim (2011)7, can
address the potentially confounding effect of temporary income (and temporarily distorted marginal
tax rates):
ln git = δi + α1∆ lnY
d
it + α2 lnY
d
it + α3∆ lnPit + α4 lnPit +Xitβ + εit (3.4)
The interpretation of the above model is that the permanent price elasticity of demand for charitable
giving is α4, while the temporary elasticity is α3 + α4. In order to estimate these equations, I
instrument lnY dit and lnPit with their first-dollar equivalent, as well as ∆ lnPit and ∆ lnY
d
it , as in
the cross-sectional models in section 3.4.1.
Adding an AMT dummy to equations 3.3 and 3.4, I estimate the following specifications,
ln git = δi + α1 lnY
d
it + α2 lnPit + γD
AMT
it +Xitβ + εit (3.5)
ln git = δi + α1∆ lnY
d
it + α2 lnY
d
it + α3∆ lnPit + α4 lnPit + γD
AMT
it +Xitβ + εit, (3.6)
7Bakija and Heim go a step further and estimate future expected income, a procedure that has a modest effect on
their results and that I do not follow here.
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and show the results in table 3.5. The results are strikingly different from those in table 3.4. To
begin with, the estimated permanent price elasticity, α2 in equation 3.5 and α4 in equation 3.6,
is significantly attenuated from the cross-sectional estimate. In all the specifications provided in
table 3.5 the price elasticity is not statistically different from 0 at any standard significant level.
In addition, the sign on the DAMTit term is now positive, albeit not statistically different from 0
either. That the point estimate of γ becomes positive when person-specific fixed effects are included
(and remains positive when temporary income and price effects are controlled for) should lead to
skepticism at the results in table 3.4.
Unlike in the cross-sectional procedure, an individual fixed-effects coefficient soaks up systematic
differences in unobserved characteristics between AMT filers and non-AMT taxpayers, potentially
reducing the bias such differences may have imparted on the results in table 3.4. The DAMTit term,
then, is identified off individual variation in tax status. Unfortunately, the low sample size of AMT
filers is somewhat exacerbated by that fact that only a subset of them move on and off the AMT,
reducing the number of records that can identify γ from 733 to 611.
Leaving the discussion of significance aside for the moment, the results from Table 3.5 (if accurate)
indicate that AMT taxpayers made slightly higher charitable contributions than their marginal tax
rates and after-tax income implied. But, in a pattern that will be repeated throughout the discussion
of the results of the panel models, these coefficients are only slightly positive and much smaller than
their respective standard errors. This observation holds true whether the income elasticity is uniform
across all gross income classes or allowed to vary, and whether multiple tax years are included as
regressors.
3.4.4 Salience Tests in Cross-Sectional Charitable-Giving Models
The estimation of a demand function for charitable donations has a graphical representation
that motivates the tests for tax salience below. In figure 3.2 I illustrate an individual’s hypothetical
demand curve for giving as a function of the after-tax price (for a given level of after-tax income).
At a 35 percent marginal tax rate, the after-tax price is 0.65 and the quantity demanded is $1,000
in contributions. The triggering of an AMT liability, with a 28 percent marginal rate, should raise
the price to 0.72, which is an increase of about 11 percent. Consequently, the taxpayer’s demand
for charitable contributions should fall to around $900 (in red), since in this example the price
elasticity is -1. In such a scenario, the econometrician would not find any particular AMT effect
distinct from the standard predicted level of charitable contributions. If the lower marginal rate
(and thus higher after-tax price) is not incorporated into the filer’s information set, however, they
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might contribute the same amount to charity as that implied by the tax price corresponding to their
traditional marginal rate (again, $1,000 in the example), which is off the demand curve in green. If
either some fraction of filers incorporate the new tax price into their decision-making process or all
filers incompletely incorporate the price into their decision, then the result is something in between,
in blue.
To investigate tax salience empirically in this setting I divide the after-tax price and income
terms in the charitable giving model into pre-AMT and post-AMT components. In the absence of
the AMT, a taxpayer perceives a marginal tax rate applicable to charitable giving P ∗it and owes tax
liability T ∗it, leaving disposable income Y
d∗
it = Yit − T ∗it. In most cases P ∗it = Pit and Y d
∗
it = Y
d
it ,
but for those hit by an AMT liability Y d
∗
it < Y
d
it and P
∗
it is less than, equal to, or greater than
Pit depending on the tax bracket of the individual involved. We can express equation 3.1 above
decomposed to separate out the ”AMT effect” like this:
ln git = α1 lnY
d∗
it
Y dit
Y d
∗
it
+ α2 lnP
∗
it
Pit
P ∗it
+Xitβ + εit, (3.7)
which I estimate as:
ln git = α1 lnY
d∗
it + γ1 ln
Y dit
Y d
∗
it
+ α2 lnP
∗
it + γ2 ln
Pit
P ∗it
+Xitβ + εit. (3.8)
The test for salience, then, involves comparison between the terms α1 and γ1, as well as α2 and
γ2. In figure 3.3 I illustrate the additional income effect of triggering an AMT liability; the demand
curve for charitable contributions is lowered by the extent to which after-tax income is decreased,
scaled by the elasticity of demand for charitable giving with respect to income (0.4 in this example).
In this illustration, full- and zero- incorporation of information into the decision-making process
are both depicted, as well as an intermediate response that reflects incomplete adjustment to tax
information on both the income and tax price dimensions.
If the filer responds in a predictable way to the increase in price and decrease in after-tax income,
shown in red, then α1 = γ1 and α2 = γ2. If the filer is oblivious to the change in after-tax income
and marginal tax rate due to triggering an AMT liability, shown in green, then they continue to
give $1,000 and γ1 = γ2 = 0. In the intermediate response, shown in blue, a variety of estimate
combinations could generate the same change in giving. Because the econometrician only views the
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final giving amount, disentangling the additional income and price effects of an AMT trigger is just
as challenging as separating the original income and price effects, with the added difficulties of 1) a
smaller sample size of AMT filers than the tax base as a whole, and 2) needing enough controls or
proxies to ensure that AMT filers are not systematically different in unobservables from the families
to which they are being compared in a counterfactual sense. Nevertheless, figure 3.3 inspires a range
of possible tests to determine whether taxpayers on the AMT incorporate their status into their
decision-making.
The relevant tests on equation 3.8 are:
1. Full Income Salience: α1 = γ1
2. No Income Salience: γ1 = 0
3. Full Price Salience: α2 = γ2
4. No Price Salience: γ2 = 0
5. Full Joint Salience: α1 = γ1 & α2 = γ2
6. No Joint Salience: γ1 = 0 & γ2 = 0
A risk in attributing all the differences, if they exist, between αi and γi to misperceptions of
price and after-tax income is the potential for composition bias, a consequence of assuming one
single price- and income- elasticity for all income levels. AMT payers differ systematically from
non-AMT payers in that they have more income on average. I follow the approach taken in Bakija
and Heim (2011) and interact all non-price controls, as well as the income variables, with a set of
dummy variables that indicate different income levels.
3.4.5 Salience Tests in Longitudinal Charitable-Giving Models
Again, cross-sectional results from direct estimation of equation 3.8 suffer from several short-
comings that can bias the estimates of α1, α2, γ1, and γ2.
I extend the identification process in equation 3.8 to a fixed-effect model and an error-correction
model in order to disentangle the income and price effects of AMT incidence. The first is given as:
ln git = δi + α1 lnY
d∗
it + γ1 ln
Y dit
Y d
∗
it
+ α2 lnP
∗
it + γ2 ln
Pit
P ∗it
+Xitβ + εit. (3.9)
The relevant tests are the same, namely that α1 = γ1 and α2 = γ2 if taxpayers have fully incorporated
their AMT status into their decision process. The panel specification of equation 3.9 ought to absorb
individual fixed effects and eliminate bias from stationary omitted variables, though not ones that
evolve over time.
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Performing the same decomposition as in equations 3.8 and 3.9, I embed a test for tax salience
in the equation above and instrument each tax variable with its first-dollar counterpart to estimate
the following model:
ln git = δi + α1∆ lnY
d∗
it + α2 lnY
d∗
it + γ1 ln
Y dit
Y d
∗
it
+ α3∆ lnP
∗
it + α4 lnP
∗
it + γ2 ln
Pit
P ∗it
+Xitβ + εit (3.10)
where ∆ lnY d
∗
it is defined as ln
Y d
∗
it
Y dit−1
. In other words, taxpayers always understand their last year’s
income tax liability, and the only question is whether they anticipate AMT liability in the year in
which it is being incurred. This specification for tax salience has different tests that correspond
to different interpretations of why a filer becomes an AMT filer. If AMT liability results from
aberrations from a normal year, then γ1 = α1 + α2 and γ2 = α3 + α4 are the relevant tests, the
derivation of which are straightforward and consigned to Appendix 3.7.2. This is my preferred set
of tests. The incremental deviation from the (regular-income-tax-derived) demand curve resulting
from AMT liability ought to match the temporary elasticity.
If, instead, an AMT liability is a normal state of affairs for a filer, then the test for salience
is γ1 = α2 and γ2 = α4, equivalent to the permanent income and price elasticity measures. This
latter interpretation, however, assumes the answer to the hypothesis it is testing: if filers are regular
AMT taxpayers, then they are undoubtedly aware of this state of affairs, so failing the test indicates
something other than what is being tested.
Thus the appropriate salience tests on equation 3.10 are as follows:
1. Full Income Salience: γ1 = α1 + α2
2. No Income Salience: γ1 = 0
3. Full Price Salience: γ2 = α3 + α4
4. No Price Salience: γ2 = 0
5. Full Joint Salience: γ1 = α1 + α2 & γ2 = α3 + α4
6. No Joint Salience: γ1 = 0 & γ2 = 0
These tests provide the proper “salience” interpretation of the coefficients and standard errors of
the charitable giving demand function estimation above.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Cross-Sectional Results
The results of the estimation of the cross-sectional specifications in section 3.4.4 are shown in table
3.6. In all specifications, the tax price and the after-tax income variables are instrumented by their
first-dollar counterparts. In the first grouping, the price elasticity of demand and income elasticity
of charitable giving are both assumed to be constant across income levels. The base case, which
yields a pair of elasticities that are readily compared with those in the considerable aforementioned
literature, appears to heighten fears of at least some attenuation bias stemming from measurement
error. The tax price elasticity of demand for charitable giving is relatively inelastic, coming in at
-0.6, while the income elasticity of demand is estimated at 0.46 (column a). When discretionary
income, as well as other non-price regressors, is allowed to vary by gross income categories (column
c), the price elasticity rises to -0.68, while the income elasticity ranges between 0.25 and 0.41. While
these results are well within the bounds of the various estimates of the past 50 years, more recent
data and survey-based data have tended to find relatively high price elasticities.
The base cases reflect attempts to remove or otherwise minimize endogeneity from the cross-
sectional specification. A simple OLS estimation of equation 1 above yields very similar elasticities
to those reported in table 3.6, column a (see table 3.1). Instrumenting the tax price of charitable
giving with the first-dollar equivalent and doing the same for discretionary income gives almost an
identical result for the price elasticity of demand, albeit raising the income elasticity somewhat. This
similarity reflects the extent that the marginal tax rate is rather unlikely to change as a result of the
magnitude of charitable donations observed in the data.8 Adding net wealth and gifts lessens the
income effect somewhat; wealth and income are positively correlated, so the extent to which realized
income just represents changes in net wealth (i.e. capital gains), it is captured by the latter term.
Inclusion of the nested terms for testing AMT salience in table 3.6 yields results with conflicting
interpretations. The incremental income effect appears to be much weaker than the baseline model
would indicate, but the price effect implies higher-than-normal responsiveness to the corresponding
marginal rates. In the language of equation 3.8, both the income-salience tests α1 = γ1 and γ1 = 0
fail to reject the null hypothesis because of the large standard errors on the coefficient of the ln
Y dit
Y d
∗
it
term, while both the price-salience tests α2 = γ2 and γ2 = 0 can be rejected at the 1 percent
significance level because of the high degree of responsiveness of the ln PitP∗it
term.
8Table 3.9 illustrates the degree to which instruments co-vary with their instrumented variables; the first stage of
each IV regression is quite strong.
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Allowing the non-price variables, including demographic, wealth, and income measures, to vary
by gross income class yields slightly different results, but with the same upshot. The standard error
on the AMT income effect is too large to reject the possibility of full salience, while the incremental
AMT price effect is strangely powerful and significantly different from the estimate for the rest of
the sample.
The constant-income-elasticity specification is readily tested against restrictions that imply either
full salience or no salience, namely the joint test that α1 = γ1 and α2 = γ2 (full salience) and γ1 = 0
and γ2 = 0 (no salience). Both of these tests are rejected with a high degree of confidence (at the
1 percent level). The loosened income-elasticity specification is harder to test; I show the test on
the highest income class in table 3.6, but a comparison of the AMT after-tax adjustment term with
every single class’s income elasticity in a joint test yields the same result - rejection of the nulls of
both full and no salience about AMT tax variables.
These joint rejections of both hypotheses are interesting, but ultimately all the rejections are on
the back of the outlier coefficients on the price adjustment terms. The combination of low sample
sizes and difficulty in selectively apportioning the combined effect of lower income and, on average,
a higher tax price of giving appears to create a significant barrier to fully identifying the salience of
the AMT in augmented PSID data using cross-sectional approaches.
3.5.2 Panel Results
The results from estimating the panel specifications in section 3.4.3 are given in tables 3.7 and
3.8. In light of the suggestive but statistically insignificant preliminary analysis in table 3.6, we turn
to results for the more detailed decomposition of the fixed-effects charitable giving demand function.
Table 3.7 restricts the model to a uniform (permanent) income elasticity. In column (b) I report the
results of estimation of equation 3.9 (column (a) shows the corresponding base case IV model with
fixed effects but no AMT decomposition). Column (d) shows the results from estimating equation
3.10 (with column (c) again playing the role of the base case). The income elasticity of the base
case in both the standard fixed-effects specification and the error-correction specification is similar
to that of the cross-sectional results. The tax price effects, however, are quite minor and in some
cases are the wrong sign (i.e., inconsistent with a downward-sloping demand curve). In contrast with
the cross-sectional results, which appear to suffer from significant mis-specification, the panel data
results are distinguished by a lack of variation and thus low-power tests.9 Both the standard fixed-
9Measurement error, as I alluded to above, is a concern in all of these specifications, but particularly in panel data.
If, for example, individual income is characterized by a high degree of auto-correlation, but measurement error has low
auto-correlation, then the attenuation bias is magnified beyond that for cross-sectional results, which may be the case
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effects estimation and the error-correction alternative fail to reject the null of either full salience or
no salience on both the income effect and the tax price effect of the AMT on charitable giving.
Table 3.8 shows results of estimation of the same set of demand functions, with the income
elasticity and other non-price variables free to differ by gross income class. Again, high standard
errors in the terms that compare 1) the tax price of charitable giving under the regular income tax
regime versus the AMT regime and 2) the discretionary income available to spend on charity under
the regular income tax regime versus the AMT regime, lead to inconclusive tests for salience in both
the fixed-effect and error-correction specifications.
3.5.3 Measurement Error
To determine whether measurement error was a factor in the spate of inconclusive tests above,
and for lack of an instrument to remove measurement error from survey data, I added iid, normally
distributed, mean zero measurement error to income in order to determine whether it resulted in
attenuation bias. Attenuation bias resulting from this exercise could imply the existence of existing
bias in the “unbiased” estimates in tables 3.3-3.8. In table 3.10, the simple cross-sectional demand
model is compared with the results from the addition of error in income. Also, I compare both
sets of results with a second exercise in which classical mean zero, iid measurement error is added
to reported charity (for those who already report non-zero contributions). Surprisingly, income
error biases the price term towards zero but not the income term. Measurement error in charitable
contributions, however, attenuates both variables. These unexpected results are probably driven by
some nonlinear relationships among the three variables that have not been fully explored.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a method for testing the salience of the Alternative Minimum Tax via a
nested demand model in cross-sectional and panel formats. The ambiguity of empirical results
highlights sample-size limitations, as well as the limitations of computing tax variables from survey
data, in which small errors can aggregate and potentially bias important relationships.
I find a negative effect of AMT liability on charity in cross-tabs and in cross-sectional regressions,
even after accounting for the expected changes to demand for contributions given lower after-tax
income and the higher after-tax price of donating. In contrast, the difference between actual and
here. Compounding the problem is that measurement error in income variables is not obviously classical measurement
error, since the error passes through a tax simulator and affects the price regressor. Classical measurement error is
addressable through IV, as the error is uncorrelated with the instrument used on it, but non-random measurement
error is more intractable. I analyze the effects of measurement error in income and charitable donations below.
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expected contributions for AMT taxpayers swings to become weakly positive but statistically in-
significant when person fixed effects or temporary income effects are accounted for.
I find similar results when I measure income and price effects in order to determine tax salience
- the wrong sign in cross-sectional specification implies an overreaction to AMT incidence, while
panel specifications suffer from large standard errors throughout that make interpretation of their
results difficult.
The weak effects in both types of analysis point to some related problems (small sample size,
measurement error) and some unique ones. Cross-sectional analysis appears to be insufficient to
capture the attributes of AMT taxpayers, which systematically differ from others in their income
cohort (likely due to higher than average temporary income), while there is good reason to suspect
that panel data magnifies the problems of measurement error and relies too heavily on changes in
AMT status from one year to the next to generate exogenous variation.
Nevertheless, the inability to distinguish between such extremely different behavioral models as
1) full incorporation of tax status into the taxpayer’s information set, and 2) full ignorance about
tax status, is intriguing. Further investigation with more accurate tax data and larger sample sizes,
especially in the income region where AMT liabilities are more prevalent, is warranted in order to
determine with greater confidence whether the AMT and other non-salient tax features (such as the
PEASE limitation) are being treated rationally by taxpayers, or are simply being ignored.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Technical Appendix on Data
This section of the appendix details the methods employed to build a panel data set with income,
demographic, tax, and wealth data using the PSID and TAXSIM.
3.7.1.1 Income Aggregates
I extracted relevant income information from each of the 1999-2013 family-level surveys in order
to create aggregate income variables that could be fed into a tax simulator (in this case TAXSIM9).
In order to do this I built on and amended code that was generously provided by M. Marit Rehavi.
The key variables include tax year, state of residence, marital status, number of dependent exemp-
tions, number of age exemptions, earned income of the household head, earned income of the spouse
(if relevant), dividend income, property income, pension income, Social Security income, non-taxable
transfer income, property taxes, rental payments, itemized deductions, childcare expenditures, un-
employment compensation, number of dependent children, and mortgage interest. TAXSIM requires
short-term and long-term capital gains as well, but this information is not available in the PSID.
To create an earned income measure, I combined wages, bonuses, tips, overtime, commissions,
professional income, garden income, and other labor income. Property income is the combination of
interest income, trust income, rental income, net alimony income, and other income. Beginning in
2003, property income is amended to be inclusive of dividends, as the TAXSIM calculator asks for
only “qualified” dividends. Pension income is the combination of VA pensions, non-VA pensions,
annuities, and other pensions (not inclusive of Social Security). Prior to the 2013 survey, the
PSID aggregated pension, annuity, and “retirement income” for the wife of the household head,
but beginning in 2013 these categories are separated. Social Security income is provided on a
total family basis prior to 2005, but afterwards head and spouse benefits are provided separately.
Non-taxable transfer income includes child support, TANF/ADC income, supplemental security
income, and other welfare income. Unemployment compensation is created from the combination of
unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation.
Mortgage interest is calculated in two ways. The simpler method is to use the outstanding
mortgage on the first two properties listed multiplied by the mortgage interest rate provided. The
second way, used in the analysis of this paper, follows the method in Kimberlin, Kim, and Schaefer
(2014). Property taxes and insurance premia are subtracted from monthly mortgage payments,
which are compared with the principal and the mortgage interest rate to infer the share of each
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payment that constitutes interest.
Although no AMT preference items are available in the PSID, non-AMT preference items in
addition to mortgage interest include miscellaneous medical expenses and charitable contributions.
3.7.1.2 Wealth Data
The PSID has several asset categories that allow for estimation of net wealth of a household. I
follow the procedure in Bosworth and Anders (2008) and aggregate housing wealth net of remaining
principal, other real estate assets, vehicles, business/farm wealth, stocks, retirement assets, other
accounts, and other wealth. Counted against this gross measure is an undifferentiated “debt” cate-
gory until 2011, at which point credit card debt, student loans, medical bills, legal bills, loans from
relatives, and other debt are separated into individual categories.
3.7.1.3 Tax Data
I feed the income aggregates into TAXSIM9, which returns a host of variables, including taxes
owed, AMT tax, and statutory marginal tax rates at the federal and state level. I increment earned
income and construct empirical marginal tax rates that compare well with these statutory rates, so
the analysis above uses the empirical rates.
The tax price of charitable donations is calculated by augmenting the non-AMT preference item
category and determining the empirical change to total taxes owed. I do this from the existing level
of donations for each filer as well as from a counter-factual tax simulation in which the filer has
no charitable donations. The two distinct empirical tax prices reflect the last-dollar price and first-
dollar price, respectively, of giving. In addition, the total tax owed in the counter-factual simulation
in which no charitable donations are counted towards non-AMT preference items doubles as the tax
from which a first-dollar measure of discretionary income can be obtained.
3.7.2 Test for Tax Salience in Panel Data Specification
As in the case of the cross-sectional specification, I define disposable income Y d as Y dit = Yit−Tit
and ex-AMT disposable income Y d
∗
as Y d
∗
it = Yit−T ∗it, where Tit = T ∗it+AMTit. The terms ∆ lnY dit
and lnY dit in Equation 4 can be expressed as
α1∆ lnY
d
it = α1 ln
Y dit
Y dit−1
= α1 ln
Y d
∗
it
Y dit−1
Y dit
Y d
∗
it
= α1(∆ lnY
d∗
it + ln
Y dit
Y d
∗
it
) (3.11)
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and
α2 lnY
d
it = α2 lnY
d∗
it
Y dit
Y d
∗
itt
= α2(lnY
d∗
it + ln
Y dit
Y d
∗
it
). (3.12)
Performing the same decomposition on Pit and combining terms, I estimate the following equation:
ln git = δi + α1∆ lnY
d∗
it + α2 lnY
d∗
it + (α1 + α2) ln
Y dit
Y d
∗
it
+ α3∆ lnP
∗
it + α4 lnP
∗
it + (α3 + α4) ln
Pit
P ∗it
+Xitβ + εit (3.13)
From Equation 3.10, then, the tests for tax and marginal rate salience are γ1 = α1 + α2 and
γ2 = α3 + α4, as stated above.
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Figure 3.1: Frequency of Charitable Contributions by Income Class
PSID, 1999 to 2013
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Figure 3.2: Rate Effect of the AMT on Charitable Contributions
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Figure 3.3: Income and Rate Effects of the AMT on Charitable Contributions
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
PSID, 1999 to 2013
Variable All Tax Units
Itemizing Tax 
Units with 
Charitable 
Contribution
AMT Filers
Number of Units 65,151 11,637 733
Average Income 57,370 117,078 271,867
Median Income 38,770 90,581 255,000
Average Wealth 281,623 637,686 1,869,790
Median Wealth 48,500 231,000 768,000
Average Tax Liability Owed 14,776 35,270 94,672
Median Tax Liability Owed 6,943 24,932 88,694
Marginal Tax Rate - Federal 12.5 23.0 33.0
Marginal Tax Rate - State 3.2 5.0 6.1
Marginal Tax Rate  - FICA 14.1 12.1 5.2
Marginal Tax Rate - All 27.4 35.8 40.6
Average Charitable Contribution, Itemizers 2,797 3,441 4,294
Proportion Itemizing and Making 
Charitable Contribution 30.9% -- 69.4%
Share of Units who are Married 48.2% 72.2% 86.2%
Average Age of Head 50.23 50.73 49.44
Average Number of Dependent Children 0.57 0.69 1.29
Notes: All numbers are weighted by PSID longitudinal family weights except number of units.  
Marginal tax rates are for earned income.
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Table 3.2: Charitable Contribution, Itemizing Status, and AMT Status by Income Group
PSID, 1999 to 2013
Gross Income Category <$20,000 $20,000-$40,000
$40,000-
$80,000
$80,000-
$160,000
$160,000-
$320,000 >$320,000
Number of Units 20,620 14,973 16,960 9,988 2,161 435
Itemize Taxes 2,172 3,260 7,637 7,233 1,846 378
Have Charitable Contribution 1,120 2,047 5,735 6,050 1,612 327
Share with Charitable Contribution 7.6% 17.4% 38.8% 63.7% 75.2% 75.2%
Have AMT Liability 0 0 16 73 470 174
Share with AMT Liability 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 22.5% 38.8%
Average Liability Among AMT Filers -- -- 1,215          1,242          1,991          4,962        
Among All Filers:
Average Charitable Contribution 163 317 821 1,936 3,602 9,108
Average Among Contributors 2,151 1,822 2,117 3,039 4,791 12,109
Median Among Contributors 600 520 900 1,200 2,100 5,000
Among AMT Filers:
Average Charitable Contribution -- -- 94 623 2,879 7,522
Average Among Contributors -- -- 736 1,084 4,071 10,280
Median Among Contributors -- -- 820 500 2,500 5,000
Notes: Results weighted by PSID longitudinal family weights except for number of units, number of units who itemize taxes, 
number of units with a charitable contribution, and number of units with an AMT liability.  Shares are weighted. Charitable 
contributions are recorded only for filers who itemize deductions.
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Table 3.3: Building a Cross-Sectional Model of Charitable Giving
PSID, 1999 to 2013
OLS Instrument for first dollar giving price
Wealth and 
Gift
Variables Vary by 
Income Class
(a) (b) (c) (d)
ln(P it ) -0.61 -0.59 -0.60 -0.68
(0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21)
ln(Y d it ) 0.79 0.57 0.46 --
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) --
ln(W it ) 0.13 0.13
(0.01) (0.01)
ln(Gift it ) 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
D 1 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.25
(0.18)
D 2 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.41
(0.10)
D 3 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.36
(0.08)
D 4 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.33
(0.08)
D 5 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.32
(0.08)
D 6 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.34
(0.10)
Notes: classes for gross income are 0-20k, 20-40k, 40-80k, 80-160k, 160k-320k, and 
>320k.  Other controls in regressions include marriage dummy; number of children; age of 
head of household; years of education of head of household; dummy variable indicating 
that household head is black; and dummy variable indicating the household head is any 
other nonwhite, nonhispanic ethnic or racial group. In the regression specifications with 
separate income classes, these variables are interacted with dummies corresponding to 
which income class the tax unit belongs.
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Table 3.4: Cross-Sectional Model of Charitable Giving, Including AMT Indicator Variable
PSID, 1999 to 2013
Constant Elasticity for 
Giving by Income
Elasticity for Giving Varies 
by Income Class
(a) (b)
D AMT it -0.09 -0.19
(0.07) (0.08)
ln(P it ) -0.64 -0.76
(0.20) (0.22)
ln(Y d it ) 0.47 --
(0.04) --
D 1 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.26
(0.18)
D 2 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.42
(0.10)
D 3 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.37
(0.08)
D 4 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.34
(0.08)
D 5 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.33
(0.08)
D 6 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.33
(0.10)
Notes: Sample size equal to 7,634 records.  Classes for gross income are 0-20k, 
20-40k, 40-80k, 80-160k, 160k-320k, and >320k.  Other controls in regressions 
include marriage dummy; number of children; age of head of household; years of 
education of head of household; dummy variable indicating that household head 
is black; dummy variable indicating the household head is any other nonwhite, 
nonhispanic ethnic or racial group; the log of wealth; and the log of gifts 
(including inheritances). In the regression specification with separate income 
classes, these variables are interacted with dummies corresponding to which 
income class the tax unit belongs.
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Table 3.5: Panel Model of Charitable Giving with Fixed Effects, Including AMT Indicator
Variable
PSID, 1999 to 2013
Constant 
Elasticity for 
Giving by 
Income
Elasticity for 
Giving Varies 
by Income 
Class
Constant 
Elasticity for 
Giving by 
Income
Elasticity for 
Giving Varies 
by Income 
Class
(a) (b) (c) (d)
D AMT it 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Δln(P it ) -- -- 0.20 0.18
-- -- (0.13) (0.13)
ln(P it ) -0.04 -0.13 -0.44 -0.49
(0.25) (0.27) (0.31) (0.33)
Δln(Y d it ) -- -- -0.02 -0.02
-- -- (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Y d it ) 0.32 -- 0.30 --
(0.06) -- (0.07) --
D 1 ln(Y
d
it ) -0.05 0.08
(0.19) (0.23)
D 2 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.21 0.16
(0.10) (0.11)
D 3 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.25 0.22
(0.08) (0.10)
D 4 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.26 0.24
(0.08) (0.10)
D 5 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.29 0.25
(0.08) (0.09)
D 6 ln(Y
d
it ) 0.33 0.34
(0.09) (0.10)
Notes: sample size of 7,634 using only current-period tax data, 6,429 incorporating 
year-over-year changes in tax data.  Other controls in regressions include marriage 
dummy; number of children; age of head of household; years of education of head of 
household; dummy variable indicating that household head is black; dummy variable 
indicating the household head is any other nonwhite, nonhispanic ethnic or racial group; 
the log of wealth; and the log of gifts (including inheritances).  395 of 733 AMT filer 
year records are first-time filers, while 216 filer year records correspond to non-AMT 
taxpayers who owed AMT liability in the prior survey.
Use Only Current-Period Tax 
Data
Incorporate Year-over-Year 
Changes in Tax Data
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Table 3.6: Cross-Sectional Model of Charitable Giving, Including AMT Salience
PSID, 1999 to 2013
Coefficient are Uniform Across 
Income Levels
Non-Price Variables Vary by 
Income Class
IV Base 
Case
AMT 
Decomposition
IV Base 
Case
AMT 
Decomposition
(a) (b) (c) (d)
ln(P * it ) -0.60 -0.82 -0.68 -0.85
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
ln(P it /P
*
it ) -- -3.86 -- -3.83
-- (1.08) -- (1.16)
ln(Y d* it ) 0.46 0.45 -- --
(0.04) (0.04) -- --
ln(Y d it /Y
d*
it ) -- -3.95 -- 1.08
-- (4.56) -- (4.94)
D 1 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.25 0.26
(0.18) (0.18)
D 2 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.41 0.42
(0.10) (0.10)
D 3 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.36 0.37
(0.08) (0.08)
D 4 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.33 0.34
(0.08) (0.08)
D 5 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.32 0.33
(0.08) (0.08)
D 6 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.34 0.32
(0.10) (0.10)
Chi-SquaredTests
Full Price Salience 0.00 0.01
No Price Salience 0.00 0.00
Full Income Salience 0.33 0.88
No Income Salience 0.39 0.83
Full Joint Salience 0.01 0.00
No Joint Salience 0.00 0.00
Notes: Sample size equal to 7,634 records.  Classes for gross income are 0-20k, 20-40k, 40-80k, 
80-160k, 160k-320k, and >320k.  Other controls in regressions include marriage dummy; number 
of children; age of head of household; years of education of head of household; dummy variable 
indicating that household head is black; dummy variable indicating the household head is any other 
nonwhite, nonhispanic ethnic or racial group; the log of wealth; and the log of gifts (including 
inheritances). In the regression specifications with separate income classes, these variables are 
interacted with dummies corresponding to which income class the tax unit belongs.
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Table 3.7: Panel Model of Charitable Giving with Fixed Effects, Including AMT Salience
Coefficients are Uniform Across Income Classes
PSID, 1999 to 2013
Use Only Current-Period Tax Data
Incorporate Year-over-Year Changes 
in Tax Data
IV Fixed 
Effects
AMT 
Decomposition
IV Fixed 
Effects
AMT 
Decomposition
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Δln(P * it ) -- -- 0.20 0.20
-- -- (0.13) (0.13)
ln(P * it ) -0.07 0.00 -0.45 -0.36
(0.24) (0.27) (0.29) (0.33)
ln(P it /P
*
it ) -- 0.36 -- 0.53
-- (0.86) -- (0.93)
Δln(Y d* it ) -- -- -0.02 -0.02
-- -- (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Y d* it ) 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.31
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
ln(Y d it /Y
d*
it ) -- 0.76 -- 2.57
-- (3.27) -- (3.39)
Chi-Squared Tests
Full Price Salience 0.62 0.37
No Price Salience 0.68 0.57
Full Income Salience 0.89 0.50
No Income Salience 0.82 0.45
Full Joint Salience 0.88 0.62
No Joint Salience 0.91 0.70
Notes: sample size of 7,634 using only current-period tax data, 6,429 incorporating year-over-year 
changes in tax data.  Other controls in regressions include marriage dummy; number of children; age of 
head of household; years of education of head of household; dummy variable indicating that household 
head is black; dummy variable indicating the household head is any other nonwhite, nonhispanic ethnic or 
racial group; the log of wealth; and the log of gifts (including inheritances).
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Table 3.8: Panel Model of Charitable Giving with Fixed Effects, Including AMT Salience
Non-Price Variables Vary Across Income Classes
PSID, 1999 to 2013
Use Only Current-Period Tax Data
Incorporate Year-over-Year 
Changes in Tax Data
IV Fixed 
Effects
AMT 
Decomposition
IV Base 
Case
AMT 
Decomposition
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Δln(P * it ) -- -- 0.18 0.18
-- -- (0.13) (0.13)
ln(P * it ) -0.17 -0.15 -0.52 -0.46
(0.26) (0.28) (0.31) (0.33)
ln(P it /P
*
it ) -- -0.03 -- 0.22
-- (0.96) -- (1.02)
Δln(Y d* it ) -- -- -0.03 -0.03
-- -- (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Y d it /Y
d*
it ) -- -0.27 -- 0.84
-- (3.61) -- (3.74)
D 1 ln(Y
d*
it ) -0.05 -0.05 0.08 0.09
(0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23)
D 2 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.16
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
D 3 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
D 4 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.24
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
D 5 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.25
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
D 6 ln(Y
d*
it ) 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Chi-Squared Tests
Full Price Salience 0.89 0.57
No Price Salience 0.98 0.83
Full Income Salience 0.87 0.89
No Income Salience 0.94 0.82
Full Joint Salience 0.96 0.84
No Joint Salience 1.00 0.96
Notes: sample size of 7,634 using only current-period tax data, 6,429 incorporating year-over-year 
changes in tax data.  Classes for gross income are 0-20k, 20-40k, 40-80k, 80-160k, 160k-320k, and 
>320k.  Other controls in regressions include marriage dummy; number of children; age of head of 
household; years of education of head of household; dummy variable indicating that household head 
is black; dummy variable indicating the household head is any other nonwhite, nonhispanic ethnic or 
racial group; the log of wealth; and the log of gifts (including inheritances). In all regression 
specifications these variables are interacted with dummies corresponding to which income class the 
tax unit belongs.
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Table 3.9: First-Stage Regression Results for Instruments
PSID, 1999-2013
Coefficient of 
Correlation Coefficient T-Statistic
R-Squared of First 
Stage
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Among all itemizers:
ln(P it ) 0.971 0.995 447.8 0.944
(0.002)
ln(Y d it ) 1.000 1.002 5112.7 1.000
(0.000)
ln(P * it ) 0.972 0.994 451.2 0.945
(0.002)
ln(Y d* it ) 1.000 1.002 5152.2 1.000
(0.000)
ln(P it /P
*
it ) 0.958 0.968 367.1 0.919
(0.003)
ln(Y d it /Y
d*
it ) 0.994 0.963 1015.9 0.989
(0.001)
Among AMT filers:
ln(P it ) 0.959 0.964 78.8 0.920
(0.012)
ln(Y d it ) 0.999 1.007 519.3 0.998
(0.002)
ln(P * it ) 0.949 0.950 69.8 0.900
(0.014)
ln(Y d* it ) 0.999 1.008 570.6 0.998
(0.002)
ln(P it /P
*
it ) 0.943 0.948 65.8 0.889
(0.014)
ln(Y d it /Y
d*
it ) 0.988 0.986 147.9 0.976
(0.007)
Notes: Results are given for primary instrument of each endogenous variable.  Sample restricted to 
itemizers.  The first two variables correspond to equation 1, while the latter four correspond to 
equation 3.
127
Table 3.10: Measurement Error in a Cross-Sectional Model of Charitable Giving
PSID, 1999-2013
Data in PSID:
ln(P it ) -0.60
(0.20)
ln(Y d it ) 0.46
(0.04)
Measurement error in income (modest):
ln(P it ) -0.55
(0.20)
ln(Y d it ) 0.47
(0.04)
Measurement error in income (significant):
ln(P it ) -0.45
(0.20)
ln(Y d it ) 0.47
(0.04)
Measurement error in giving:
ln(P it ) -0.71
(0.20)
ln(Y d it ) 0.43
(0.04)
Notes: controls in regressions include marriage dummy; number of children; 
age of head of household; years of education of head of household; dummy 
variable indicating that household head is black; and dummy variable 
indicating the household head is any other nonwhite, nonhispanic ethnic or 
racial group. In the panel for modest measurement error in income, random 
error with mean of 0 and standard deviation of $1,000 was added to wages.  In 
the panel for significant measurement error in income, random error with mean 
of 0 and standard deviation of $10,000 was added to wages.  In the panel for 
measurement error in charitable giving, random error with mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of $100 was added to donations, conditional on the tax filer 
having a positive charitable donation.
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